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I. PREFACE 
As the title indicates, this thesis is about asset allocation, security selection and market timing 
in mutual funds. This is a topic that should be of interest for most people that let mutual funds 
handle their personal wealth or pension liabilities. Natural questions to ask in this matter are 
“What asset classes is my wealth/pension exposed to?” and “How is the performance of my 
manager?” This thesis will enable investors to answer such questions, and more.  
 
When I was on exchange at Johnson School at Cornell University, I was introduced to these 
exciting topics in a course called “Investments” taught by Professor G. Saar. During this 
course I was also introduced to many interesting academic papers. Among these, were two 
papers which have an important part in this thesis; namely “Asset Allocation: Management 
Style and Performance Measurement” by Nobel laureate W. Sharpe (1992) and “Determinants 
of Portfolio Performance” by Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986). Both these papers 
combine mathematics and econometrics into elegant and pedagogical models. Basically, this 
thesis combines the insight from these papers to answer a set of questions that are relevant for 
people investing in mutual funds.  
 
The process of writing this thesis has been interesting and challenging at the same time. I have 
had the possibility to be both creative and to use accumulated knowledge. Most importantly, 
the process of writing this thesis has enabled me to learn much more about topics that I find 
very interesting. Having taken courses such as “Financial Theory”, “Econometric 
Techniques”, “Times Series Analysis and Prediction” and “Empirical Analysis of Financial 
and Commodity Markets” has been vital in order to write this thesis.  
II. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I would like to thank my advisor Knut K. Aase for the helpful discussions I had with him, and 
all his comments. I am grateful to Petter Slyngstadli in Holberg Forvaltning for giving me 
updated Norwegian mutual fund data. I am also thankful to Andreas Steiner, whom made the 
MATLAB code for Return Based Style Analysis available through the MATLAB Central. My 
lecturer in “Time Series Analysis and Prediction”, Jonas Anderson, has also been helpful 
when I have had questions. Lastly, I am grateful for all the encouragement and help from 
family and friends.  
Bjarte Espedal 
Bergen, June 2011 
iv 
 
III. ABSTRACT 
CHAPTER 1: Estimating Determinants of a Mutual Fund’s Risk and Managerial 
Performance 
In this chapter, we construct a framework that can be used by investors to independently 
estimate a mutual fund’s actual and policy weights in a set of predefined asset classes, and to 
estimate a mutual fund’s security selection and market timing. Our framework has its 
foundation in a paper by Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986). By generalizing the ideas in 
their paper, we see that we can measure a fund’s security selection and market timing only if 
we have the actual and policy weights. We argue that weights that reflect the fund’s short-
term and long-term behavior are good estimates of a fund’s actual and policy weights 
respectively. In this matter, we can get estimates of the actual and policy weights by using 
Return Based Style Analysis (Sharp, 1992) in two steps. These estimates can in turn be used 
to estimate the fund’s security selection and market timing.  
 
CHAPTER 2: An Empirical Study of Norwegian Mutual Fund Managers  
In this chapter, we use the framework developed in chapter 1 to answer 3 important questions 
related to Norwegian mutual fund managers: 1) How much of the total variation in mutual 
fund return is explained by asset allocation, security selection and market timing respectively? 
2) Is the average managerial performance positive? 3) Ceteris paribus, does a change in a 
mutual fund’s management cause a change in managerial performance? We find that a fund’s 
respective asset allocation, security selection and market timing explain 90.6%, 4.5% and 
4.9% of the variation over time. Moreover, we find that the mutual funds are good in picking 
stocks, but loose by timing the market. In sum, the managerial performance is not 
significantly different from 0. We also find that when poor performing managers are replaced, 
excess return increases significantly. The opposite result holds when the very best managers 
are replaced.  
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: C32; C61; G20; G23 
Keywords: Asset Allocation; Security Selection; Market Timing; Return Based Style Analysis 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENT:  
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER 1: Estimating Determinants of a Mutual Fund’s Risk and Managerial Performance ......... 7 
1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 7 
1.2. Determinants of Mutual Fund Performance ................................................................................ 9 
1.3. The Asset Classes Constituting our Benchmark........................................................................ 17 
1.3.1. Style Investing ....................................................................................................................... 17 
1.3.2. Asset Classes for Norwegian Mutual Funds ......................................................................... 20 
1.3.3. Section Summary .................................................................................................................. 22 
1.4. Estimating a Mutual Fund’s Weights using Return Based Style Analysis ................................ 23 
1.4.1. Multifactor-Models ............................................................................................................... 23 
1.4.2. From Linear Regression to Quadratic Programming ............................................................ 26 
1.4.3. Return Based Style Analysis ................................................................................................. 28 
1.4.4. The Duck Theorem ................................................................................................................ 32 
1.4.5. Evaluating the Asset Classes ................................................................................................. 34 
1.4.6. An Investor’s Effective Asset Mix ........................................................................................ 34 
1.4.7. Approximating the Confidence Intervals for the Style-Weights ........................................... 35 
1.4.8. Section Summary .................................................................................................................. 37 
1.5. Combining Style-Analysis and the BHB-framework ................................................................ 38 
1.5.1. A Two-Step Approach using RBSA ...................................................................................... 38 
1.5.2. Finding the Optimal Time Length for Describing a Mutual Fund’s Short-Term Movements
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………41 
1.5.3. Section Summary .................................................................................................................. 42 
1.6. Estimating Determinants of Risk and Managerial Performance using Norwegian Mutual-Fund 
Data ........................................................................................................................................... 43 
1.6.1. Mutual Fund Data .................................................................................................................. 43 
1.6.2. Finding   for Norwegian Mutual Funds ............................................................................... 43 
1.6.3. Estimating a Mutual Fund’s Determinants Risk ................................................................... 46 
1.6.4. Estimating a Mutual Fund’s Determinants of Managerial Performance ............................... 51 
1.6.5. Section Summary .................................................................................................................. 56 
1.7. Weaknesses in Framework and Future Research ...................................................................... 57 
1.8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 58 
CHAPTER 2: An Empirical Study of Norwegian Mutual Fund Managers ......................................... 61 
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 61 
2.1.1. Problem Statement 1: ............................................................................................................ 61 
vi 
 
2.1.2. Problem Statement 2 ............................................................................................................. 63 
2.1.3. Problem Statement 3 ............................................................................................................. 63 
2.1.4. Disposal ................................................................................................................................. 65 
2.2. Methodology and Data .............................................................................................................. 66 
2.2.1. Methodology and Data in Problem Statement 1 .................................................................... 67 
2.2.2. Methodology and Data in Problem Statement 2 .................................................................... 68 
2.2.3. Methodology and Data in Problem Statement 3 .................................................................... 69 
2.3. Results and Analysis ................................................................................................................. 73 
2.3.1. Problem Statement 1 ............................................................................................................. 73 
2.3.2. Problem Statement 2 ............................................................................................................. 74 
2.3.3. Problem Statement 3 ............................................................................................................. 75 
2.4. Weaknesses of Study ................................................................................................................. 82 
2.4.1. Sample Size ........................................................................................................................... 82 
2.4.2. Survivorship Bias .................................................................................................................. 82 
2.5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 83 
2.5.1. Problem statement 1: ............................................................................................................. 83 
2.5.2. Problem statement 2: ............................................................................................................. 83 
2.5.3. Problem statement 3: ............................................................................................................. 83 
2.5.4. Implication of Results – and Lessons to be drawn ................................................................ 84 
APPENDIX .......................................................................................................................................... 85 
3.1. APPENDIX A: Definitions ....................................................................................................... 85 
3.2. APPENDIX B: Testing for Unit-Root ....................................................................................... 87 
3.3. APPENDIX C: Confidence Interval of Style-Weights .............................................................. 89 
3.4. APPENDIX D: Current Mutual Funds ...................................................................................... 92 
3.5. APPENDIX E: Testing for Unit-Root ....................................................................................... 93 
3.6. APPENDIX F: Mutual funds in Problem Statement 2 .............................................................. 94 
3.7. APPENDIX G: Mutual funds in Problem Statement 3 ............................................................. 95 
3.8. APPENDIX H: Average return ................................................................................................. 95 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................... 96 
4.1. Academic Papers ....................................................................................................................... 96 
4.2. Academic Papers without Direct References ............................................................................ 98 
4.3. Books ......................................................................................................................................... 98 
4.4. Data Sources .............................................................................................................................. 99 
4.5. Internet....................................................................................................................................... 99 
4.6. Other Sources .......................................................................................................................... 100 
 
1 
 
“Next, where the Sirens dwells, you plough the seas; 
Their song is death, and makes destruction please. 
Unblest the man, whom music wins to stay 
Nigh the cursed shore and listen to the lay. 
No more that wretch shall view the joys of life 
His blooming offspring, or his beauteous wife! 
In verdant meads they sport; and wide around 
Lie human bones that whiten all the ground: 
The ground polluted floats with human gore, 
And human carnage taints the dreadful shore 
Fly swift the dangerous coast: let every ear 
Be stopp‟d against the song! „tis death to hear! 
Firm to the mast with chains thyself be bound, 
Nor trust thy virtue to the enchanting sound. 
If, mad with transport, freedom thou demand, 
Be every fetter strain‟d, and added band to band.” 
 
The Odyssey XII, by Homer 
INTRODUCTION 
Asset allocation, Security Selection and Market Timing in Mutual Funds 
In the epic poem Odyssey, Homer writes that Odysseus wanted to reassert his place as the 
rightful king of Ithaca. In this matter, he had to sail the perilous route from Circe’s Island to 
Ithaca. Equivalently, mutual funds and their managers have to guide themselves through a sea 
of risky investments in order to reach their goals of becoming the kings of the financial 
industry.  
 
Circe advised Odysseus to sail a specific route in order to get to Ithaca. Hence, Odysseus had 
a pre-defined route with some expected dangers, much like mutual funds have a pre-defined 
asset allocation with a given level of expected risk. Asset allocation refers to the long-term 
decision regarding the proportions of total assets that an investor chooses to place in particular 
classes of investments (Swensen, 2005). We call these long-term proportions policy weights. 
These weights are often based on an underlying investment philosophy, which is a coherent 
way of thinking about how financial markets work.   
 
New information and events happening along the pre-defined route made it tempting for 
Odysseys to deviate from Circe’s advice. One such situation occurred when Odysseys had to 
pass the Sirens. The sirens were creatures that sung so beautiful that sailors were lured to sail 
into a deathly shore. Odysseus was curious as to what the Sirens sounded like. Therefore, on 
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Circe’s advice, he had all his sailors plug their ears with beeswax and tie him to the mast. He 
ordered his men to leave him tied to the mast no matter how much he would beg them to untie 
him. When Odysseus heard the sirens’ beautiful song, he ordered the sailors to untie him, but 
they bound him just tighter. When the ship had passed the Sirens out of earshot, Odysseus 
signalized with his frowns to be released. Although Odysseus found it tempting to deviate 
from his pre-defined route as he passed the Sirens, this would have ended his journey. Hence, 
he well in listening to Circe’s advice and stick to the pre-defined route.  
 
Just as Odysseus had the possibility to deviate from his pre-defined route, your mutual fund 
manager can choose to deviate from the policy weights by strategic under- or overweighting 
the asset classes. We call this market timing. Market timers hope to underweight prospectively 
poorly performing asset classes and overweight prospectively strongly performing asset 
classes to enhance portfolio returns (Swensen, 2005). Due to market timing, the short-term 
risk will deviate from normal levels, and the short-term proportions placed in particular 
classes of investments will deviate from the policy weights. We call the mutual fund’s 
proportions placed in particular classes of investments in the beginning of the current period 
(hence short-term) for actual weights. These weights constitute the mutual fund’s current 
allocation.  
 
Economists have for long questioned what a mutual fund’s optimal portfolio choice should 
be. Mossin (1968), Merton (1969, 1971) and Samuelson (1969) (hereafter MMS) were first to 
find an answer. To exemplify MMS’ findings, say we have a mutual fund that wants to 
maximize its expected utility of assets under management (final wealth) with respect to its 
allocation between equity and bonds. MMS show that the multiperiod problem is degenerated 
into several one-period problems under the following assumptions (Aase, 2009):  
 
i) The returns of the asset classes are independently and identically distributed with 
jointly normally distributions (i.e., returns of equity and bonds have constant 
expectation and standard deviation)  
ii) The mutual fund has a additively separable constant relative risk-aversion (i.e., 
risk aversion is independent of the assets under management) 
iii) The mutual fund has no non-tradable assets (i.e., only investment income is 
considered)  
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iv) Financial markets (i.e., stock and bond market) are frictionless and complete1 
Under these assumptions, the solution to the problem satisfying the assumptions can be shown 
to give a constant allocation between equity and bonds, which is independent of both 
investment horizon and the mutual fund’s assets under management. Presumably, this 
constant allocation is the same as the mutual fund’s policy weights for equity and bonds. This 
implies that when the stock market boosts, it is optimal to sell equity and buy bonds, whereas 
when the stock market falls, the fund should sell bonds and buy equity. This argument can be 
generalized to n asset classes, making it optimal to stick to the policy weights which are found 
by solving MMS’ problem. Of course, for practical purposes, mutual funds just pick some 
subjective policy weights that they feel are according to their desired level of risk.  
 
Based on the above arguments, the discretionary policy of market timing is not optimal. Just 
like Circe advised Odysseus to bind himself to the mast and stick to his pre-defined route, the 
economists advise mutual fund managers to stick to their predefined policy-weights. In effect, 
this is an argument for rules rather than discretion; mutual funds that do this have policy 
weights that are equal to their actual weights.  
 
Although economists have long advised investors not to time the market, buying equity in a 
bear market and selling equity in a bull market is contrary to human nature. Humans go in 
crowds and engage in counterproductive performance by buying yesterday’s winners and 
selling yesterday’s losers. Interestingly, the most frequent variant of market timing comes not 
in the form of explicit bets for or against asset classes, but in the form of a passive drift away 
from target allocations (Swensen, 2005). If investors fail to counter market moves by 
rebalancing their portfolio, the allocation inevitably moves away from the policy weights. A 
simple buy and hold portfolio is an example of a strategy that passively drifts away from the 
policy weights in the long run.  
 
Based on MMS’s arguments, we can expect that successful mutual funds are able to act in a 
contrarian way, and that they rebalance their portfolios as often as possible. However, if 
MMS’s assumptions are too strict, market timing might be valuable. For example, if a mutual 
                                                          
1
 A complete market is a system of market in which every agent (here: mutual fund) is able to exchange every 
good (here: bonds and equity), either directly or indirectly, with every other agent (Flood, 1991) 
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fund finds that past returns of a specific asset class can be used to predict future returns, this is 
clearly something they should take advantage of by timing the market.  
 
By improving the sailing along the pre-defined route, Odysseus could get to Ithaca quicker. 
Equivalently in the capital markets, your mutual fund manager will try to pick the stocks that 
boost the mutual fund’s return. This tool is called security selection, and is the active selection 
of investments within an asset class (Brinson, Hood and Beebower, 1986). The amount of 
security selection that is generated by a mutual fund is dependent on the market’s efficiency.  
 
Roberts (1967) and Fama (1970) define three levels of market efficiency: weak form, semi-
strong form, and strong form market efficiency. The weak form market efficiency claims that 
stock prices reflect all past public information and that it is not possible to earn positive 
security selection based on historical information. Semi-strong form market efficiency says 
that stock prices reflect all publicly available information. Hence, new public information will 
instantly be absorbed into the price. Strong form market efficiency claims that all public and 
private information are reflected in the stock price; this implies that inside information is 
baked into the price. Beating the market by security selection and not luck is dependent on 
information or skills. This implies that a market with successful active management cannot be 
efficient in the semi-strong form.  
 
A benchmark is the standard in which the mutual fund’s return is evaluated against. A passive 
mutual fund tries to track a given benchmark whereas an active mutual fund attempts to 
generate return in excess of the benchmark. Sharpe (1991) argues that over any specified time 
period, the market return must equal a weighted average of the return on the passive and 
active segments of the market. Since each passive manager obtains exactly the market return, 
before costs, it follows that the return on the average actively managed dollar must equal the 
market return. Since the cost of the actively managed dollar is larger than the passively 
managed dollar, it implies that after cost, the return on the average actively managed dollar 
will be less than the return on the average passively managed dollar. This can have two 
implications: 1) the average active return of mutual funds is negative after cost, or 2) active 
return is positive at the expense of investors outside the mutual funds. If mutual funds do 
indeed have skills or have information, they will be in the second category.  
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Problem Statements and Disposal 
We have now discussed the 3 tools capital markets provide for mutual funds to employ in 
generating investment returns: asset allocation, security selection and market timing. Together 
these tools constitute the determinants of a mutual fund’s return. The return associated to the 
asset allocation is the investor’s responsibility and not the manager’s, since the investor 
chooses to bet on that particular risk. Since it is the investor’s job to find out whether a mutual 
fund suits their risk-tolerance, it is essential to have an overview of a funds’ risk. A mutual 
fund’s risk is a function of its investments; hence, the determinants of current (short-term) and 
normal (long-term) risk can be measured by the actual and policy weights respectively. The 
question is: how do we get access to these weights?  
 
Most managers provide some form of information to their investors regarding what they 
currently invest in and what their asset allocation is. However, different managers interpret 
and define investments differently; thus, if one invests in many different mutual funds, it 
might be hard to see through what assets classes one’s money is really exposed to and 
whether the bets offset each other. Moreover, the information from the mutual funds may be 
delayed and even false. In fact, DiBartolomeo and Witkowski (1997) and Brown and 
Goetzmann (1997) find that up to 40% of mutual funds are misclassified if self-reported 
investment objectives are compared to actual investments. Thus, moral hazard is a large 
problem.  
 
Once an asset allocation has been made, it is up to the mutual fund’s manager to enhance the 
fund’s return through security selection and/or market timing. Thus we say that the 
determinants of managerial performance are security selection and market timing. In order for 
investors to be able to evaluate a manager’s performance and to gain an understanding on 
whether it is worth paying management fees for active management, we need an overview of 
how much security selection and market timing the fund has been able to create historically. 
The sequential question is: does the mutual fund provide us with these figures?  
 
Fortunately, most portfolio managers provide information to their investors regarding how 
much return they create in excess of some benchmark. However, few managers tell us how 
much is created by security selection and market timing respectively. Moreover, if the mutual 
fund uses a benchmark with less risk than the risk of their asset allocation, it is a tautology 
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that they manage to beat their benchmark on average, without utilizing security selection and 
market timing (provided that financial theory works).  
 
With the above issues in mind, it would be useful for investors to have a framework that 
allows them to independently measure the determinants of a mutual fund’s risk and 
managerial performance. Hence, in chapter 1, we aim to develop a framework that answers 
the following problem statements:  
 
 How can an investor estimate a mutual fund‟s actual and policy weights in a set of 
asset classes? 
 How can an investor estimate a mutual fund‟s security selection and market timing? 
 
We will see that the two problem-questions are closely related, and the second problem 
statement cannot be answered without answering the first problem statement. In order to 
illustrate the framework that is used to discuss these problem statements, we will apply it on 
active Norwegian mutual funds that focus on the Norwegian equity market.  
 
In Chapter 2 we use the framework developed in Chapter 1 to study three important questions 
related to Norwegian mutual fund managers:  
 
1) How much of the total variation in mutual fund return is explained by asset allocation, 
security selection and market timing respectively? 
2) Is the average managerial performance positive? 
3) Ceteris paribus, does a change in a mutual fund‟s management cause a change in 
managerial performance? 
 
The results of these problem statements are relevant in order to understand the importance of 
mutual funds and their managers.  
 
In appendix A is a list of definitions of the terms that are frequently used in this thesis.  
 
 
 
7 
 
CHAPTER 1:  
Estimating Determinants of a Mutual Fund’s 
Risk and Managerial Performance 
 
– A Two-Step Approach using Return Based Style Analysis 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
mutual fund’s risk is a function of its investments. This implies that the 
determinants of a mutual fund’s short- and long-term risk are measured by the 
fund’s actual and policy weights respectively. Once an asset allocation has been made, it is 
the manager’s task to enhance the fund’s performance by security selection and/or market 
timing. This implies that the determinants of managerial performance are measured by the 
amount of security selection and market timing the fund utilizes. The purpose of this chapter 
is to develop a framework that can easily be used by investors to independently estimate a 
mutual fund’s actual weights and policy weights in a set of asset classes, and to estimate a 
mutual fund’s security selection and market timing.  
 
In the classical paper “Determinants of Portfolio Performance” (1986), Brinson, Hood, and 
Beebower propose a framework that decomposes pension plan returns into benchmark return, 
market timing and security selection. We will see by generalizing this framework, we are able 
to get measures of a mutual fund’s security selection and market timing. However, to get 
these figures, we have to know the fund’s actual and policy weights of a set of predefined 
asset classes in advance. One method which can be used to find these weights has become 
known as “Portfolio Based Style Analysis”. This is an approach in which the characteristics of 
a fund over a period of time are derived from the characteristics of the securities it contains at 
various points in time. Such a method requires the need of a database that contains the 
characteristics of each security in the investable universe of the fund being analyzed. 
Furthermore, it requires a record of the security holdings of each fund being analyzed 
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(Kaplan, 2003). Unfortunately, investors do not usually have the ability, time or money to 
build and update such databases. 
 
In the paper entitled “Asset Allocation: Management Style and Performance Measurement”,2 
Nobel laureate W. F. Sharpe (1992) presents a model that substantially simplifies the cost and 
time associated with Portfolio Based Style Analysis. The method has become known as 
“Return Based Style Analysis”.3 It involves a multifactor model that determines a mutual 
fund’s effective exposure to the changes in the values of some predefined asset classes over 
time. We will see that by using this model in two steps, we get estimates that mimic the 
fund’s actual and policy weights in the predefined asset classes, which in turn can be used in 
the generalized framework by Brinson, Hood and Beebower to estimate a mutual fund’s 
security selection and market timing. 
 
The framework we suggest in this chapter enables an investor to easily evaluate their 
manager’s track record. Furthermore, it gives the user an overview of one or several funds’ 
short- and long-term risk. This can in turn be used by the investor to judge whether the funds 
are suitable for their risk-tolerance. In order to illustrate the method, we will apply it on active 
Norwegian mutual funds that focus on Norwegian equity. For simplicity, we will look at 
mutual funds that only have long positions in the asset classes.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 generalizes Brinson, Hood and Beebower’s 
framework in order to use it in our setting. In section 1.3, we look at what asset classes can be 
used to constitute a benchmark for Norwegian mutual funds. In section 1.4, we look at 
Sharpe’s model. In section 1.5 we combine Sharpe’s model with the generalized BHB-
framework, and in section 1.6 we illustrate our framework using Norwegian mutual fund data. 
In section 1.7, we quickly summarize the framework’s weaknesses, and indicate what future 
research should focus on. Section 1.7 concludes this chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Listed as the most cited paper in the category “Global Finance and Investment Articles” by Institutional 
Investor Journals 
3
 Also known as “Returns-Based Style Analysis”, or simply just “Style Analysis” 
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1.2. Determinants of Mutual Fund Performance 
The aim of this chapter is to develop a framework that can be used to estimate a mutual fund’s 
actual weights and policy weights in a set of asset classes, and estimate a mutual fund’s 
security selection and market timing. In this matter, a framework used by Brinson, Hood and 
Beebower (hereafter BHB) in the paper entitled “Determinants of Portfolio Performance” 
(1986) can be a useful starting point. Unfortunately, BHB’s framework is more appropriate to 
the data they have on hand than being suited as a generalized framework. Therefore we will 
generalize BHB’s ideas in order to be able to use their framework in our setting. We will see 
that if we have some predefined asset classes with associated indices, and have full 
knowledge of a mutual fund’s actual weights and policy weights in these predefined asset 
classes, we can use the framework to calculate the determinants of managerial performance; 
i.e., security selection and market timing.  
 
Recall that capital markets provide 3 tools for mutual funds to employ in generating 
investment returns: asset allocation, security selection and market timing. Previously, we 
defined a benchmark as the standard in which a mutual fund’s return is evaluated against. If 
we assume that we have a benchmark that is determined by the mutual fund’s asset allocation 
(i.e., the fund’s long-term investment policy), we can decompose a mutual fund’s return 
according to Table 1:  
TABLE 1: 
Decomposing a Mutual Fund’s Performance
Selection 
Actual Passive 
T
im
in
g
 A
ct
u
al
 (IV) 
Mutual Fund Return 
(II) 
Benchmark and 
Timing Return 
P
as
si
v
e (III) 
Benchmark and 
Security Selection 
Return 
(I) 
Benchmark Return 
 
  
 
 
Market Timing      =  Quadrant II    –  Quadrant I  
                =  Quadrant IV  –  Quadrant III 
Security Selection =  Quadrant III   –  Quadrant I 
                              =  Quadrant IV   –  Quadrant II 
Excess Return       =  Quadrant IV   –  Quadrant I 
 
By default, we let Quadrant I represent the mutual fund’s benchmark return, i.e., the fund’s 
asset allocation.
4
 If the mutual fund has a current allocation (cf. Introduction/Appendix A) 
                                                          
4
 This implies that the terms “benchmark return” and “return from asset allocation” can be used interchangeably 
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with equivalent risk as the benchmark, the effect of security selection and market timing 
should be zero provided that financial theory works. This means that the effect of security 
selection and market timing is zero in Quadrant I. If we add market timing to the benchmark, 
we get Quadrant II (given the obvious name “Benchmark and Timing Return”). When we add 
security selection to the benchmark, we get Quadrant III (called “Benchmark and Security 
Selection Return”). The sum of the benchmark return, security selection and market timing is 
the same as a mutual fund’s total return, as represented by Quadrant IV. This framework will 
be referred to as the generalized BHB-framework. 
 
We define the sum of security selection and market timing as excess return. The 
decomposition implies that the excess return is equivalent to the difference between the 
mutual fund’s actual return (Quadrant IV) and that of the benchmark (Quadrant I). 
Furthermore, market timing is equivalent to the difference between Quadrant II and I, or 
equivalently, Quadrant IV – Quadrant III. Security selection can be calculated by subtracting 
Quadrant I from Quadrant III, or equivalently, Quadrant IV minus Quadrant II.  
 
The framework in Table 1 shows how we can decompose the determinants of a mutual fund’s 
performance. Recall that the fund’s manager is not responsible for the amount of return 
generated by the asset allocation; this is the investor’s responsibility, since the investor 
chooses to bet on that particular risk. The manager is only responsible for the amount that is 
created in excess of the asset allocation. This implies that the determinants of managerial 
performance are measured through security selection and market timing. Since we can 
measure security selection by Quadrant IV – Quadrant II and market timing by Quadrant II – 
Quadrant I, we only need to quantify Quadrant IV, II and I in order to measure the 
determinants of managerial performance. This brings us to the question of how we should 
calculate the return of each quadrant in Table 1. In general, the total return of a mutual fund 
can be calculated with the following formula:  
(1)                                                    
Where:  
         = Weight in asset i in period T-1 =  
                                    
                               
 
        =  Return of asset i in period T 
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The traditional view of asset allocation assumes that when investors place their money in 
mutual funds, the money will be diversified across many different asset classes.
5
 Ultimately, 
we are interested in the mutual fund’s exposures to key asset classes. It may therefore be more 
sensible to apply formula (1) on asset classes instead of assets when calculating the return of a 
mutual fund. Hence, we suggest setting       = weight in asset class i in period T-1, and       
= return of asset class i in period T. There are at least two reasons why we should do this. 
Firstly, categorization into asset classes allows us to process large amounts of information 
reasonably efficiently. The second reason is simply that it allows us to make a benchmark that 
reflects a fund’s long-term investment policy, which in turn can be used to measure a fund’s 
security selection and market timing.  
 
We have previously defined two types of asset class weights, namely actual weights and 
policy weights. Recall that the actual weights are the mutual fund’s proportions placed in 
particular classes of investments in the beginning of the current period, whereas the policy 
weights are the fund’s long-term proportions placed in particular classes of investments. 
Assuming we are in period T, we can denote the actual weight and the policy weight for asset 
class i as     and     respectively.6   
 
There are also two types of asset class returns; namely passive return and active return. We 
define the passive return as the benchmark return for a given asset class. The passive return 
for asset class i in period T can be denoted as     , and its value is calculated by 
           
      
, 
where       = price for asset class i in period T as measured by an associated index. The active 
return is the mutual fund’s actual return in a given asset class. The active return for asset class 
i at time T can be denoted as      . By combining these two returns with the two weights in 
all possible ways, we can measure each of the quadrants in Table 1.  
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 This seems to be a realistic assumption for Norwegian Mutual funds, as they are required by law to invest in at 
least 16 different stocks. Furthermore, the actual weight in any company cannot exceed 10% 
6
 Although it could be more intuitive to denote the actual weight as       in order to indicate that it is the 
proportion placed in asset class i in the beginning of the current period, we denote it as    . The reason for this 
is to avoid confusion in statements such as “the actual weight in period T is      ”. Now we can say “the 
actual weight in period T is     ”. Moreover, note that a fund’s policy weights are independent of time. 
Because of this, its denotation has no time-subscript 
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Quadrant I represents the benchmark return, with no security selection or market timing. This 
suggests that the return of Quadrant I in period T can be calculated by multiplying each asset 
class’ policy weight with their passive return in period T, and then summing this across all the 
asset classes. 
 
Quadrant II represents the benchmark return plus market timing. Keep in mind that market 
timing is the strategic under- or overweighting of an asset class relative to its policy weight. 
Hence, the return of Quadrant II in period T can be calculated by multiplying each asset class’ 
actual weight in period T with their passive return in period T, and then summing this across 
all the asset classes.  
 
Quadrant III represents the benchmark return plus security selection. We defined security 
selection as the active selection of investments within an asset class. This suggests that the 
return of Quadrant III in period T can be calculated by multiplying each asset class’ policy 
weight with the their active return in period T, and then summing this across all the asset 
classes.  
 
Quadrant IV represents the mutual fund return, and consists of the benchmark return plus 
security selection and market timing. This implies that the return of Quadrant IV in period T 
can be calculated by multiplying each asset class’ actual weight in period T with their active 
return in period T, and then summing this across all the asset classes.   
 
The above arguments are expressed mathematically in Table 2:  
TABLE 2: 
Computing the Determinants of Mutual Fund Performance in period T: 
 
Selection 
Actual Passive 
T
im
in
g
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al
 (IV) 
            
 
   
 
(II) 
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(III) 
           
 
   
 
(I) 
            
 
   
 
 
 
 
    = Asset class i’s policy weight 
    = Asset class i’s actual weight in period T 
      = Asset class i‟s passive return in period T  
      = Asset class i’s active return in period T 
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In order to make the framework operational, we segment the benchmark into n predefined 
asset classes. In BHB’s analysis, the actual weights (i.e.,        for the predefined asset 
classes are specified in advance by the pension plans. In order to find the policy weights for 
each predefined asset class (i.e.,    ), BHB assume that the 10-year average actual weight of 
each predefined asset class is sufficient to approximate the long-term proportion. They argue 
that the reason for why this is a good approximation is that 10 years covers several business 
cycles, and that the average standard deviation of asset class holdings for common stocks and 
bonds is not high relative to the average amount held.  
 
We have generalized BHB’s framework in order to be able to use it in any setting where we 
know the fund’s respective actual weights, policy weights, passive returns and active returns 
in a set of predefined asset classes. The reason for this is as follows. BHB segment the 
benchmark into common stocks, bonds, cash equivalents and a miscellaneous category, called 
“others”.7 In BHB’s analysis, the complete history of the contents in the “others” component 
is not available for all plans. Unfortunately, this complicates their framework. In order to 
make the framework appropriate to the data BHB have on hand, they measure managerial 
performance somewhat different than us. Just as in the generalized framework we have 
reviewed, BHB calculate market timing as Quadrant II – Quadrant I, and security selection as 
Quadrant III – Quadrant I. Moreover, they calculate excess return by Quadrant IV – Quadrant 
I. However, since BHB do not have the complete history of the contents in the “others” 
component, this is left as a residual when they subtract security selection and market timing 
from excess return. Hence, the “others” component can be measured by Quadrant IV – 
Quadrant III – Quadrant II + Quadrant I. In our setting, the effect of the “others” component 
is 0. This is because we assume that we know all the actual and policy weights of all the 
predefined asset classes, and that we know the passive and actual returns of these asset 
classes. In other words, we assume we know the complete history of the content of all asset 
classes.  
 
Although our interest is in the generalized framework, let us quickly look at what BHB use 
their (specialized) framework for and what their results are. Using 91 large U.S. pension 
plans, BHB (mainly) answer the following questions:  
                                                          
7
 The component called “others” contains convertible securities, international holdings, real estate, venture 
capital, insurance contracts, mortgage-backed bonds and private placements 
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1) How much of the pension plan’s total return is attributed to security selection and 
market timing? 
2) How much of the total variation in pension plan return is explained by the different 
quadrants over time?  
 
In relation to question 1), BHB find that the pension plans on average lose by market timing 
and security selection. In relation to question 2), BHB find that the benchmark alone explains 
93.6% of the total variation in actual return over time. This figure was seen as surprisingly 
high, and the results have been debated since (see e.g., Hood, 2005 or Xiong et al., 2010). 
Moreover, they find that quadrant II explains 95.3% of the variation over time, whereas 
quadrant III explains 97.8% of the variation over time. By definition, quadrant IV explains all 
the variation over time. 
 
We will now formulate more quantitatively how the generalized BHB-framework can be used 
in our setting to measure a mutual fund’s security selection and market timing. Previously we 
saw that we only need to quantify Quadrant IV, II and I in order to measure a mutual fund’s 
security selection and market timing. For illustrational purposes, we will measure security 
selection and market timing for active Norwegian Mutual funds that focus on the Norwegian 
equity market. For simplicity, we will only look at mutual funds that have long positions in 
the n predefined asset classes. Moreover, we assume we know all the actual and policy 
weights of these predefined asset classes, and that we know their passive and actual returns. 
This implies that 100% of the fund’s assets are invested in the n predefined asset classes both 
in the short-term and long-term. Sadly, we do not get the actual weights from the mutual 
funds like BHB do. However, in the next section we will get back to a method that enables us 
to get estimates that mimic a fund’s actual and policy weights in a set of predefined asset 
class. Assuming we have the policy weights and the passive returns for n predefined asset 
class, the return of mutual fund m at time T in our setting can be formulated as follows: 
(2)                 
 
               
where     
  
   for i=1…n, and    
  
 
      
The terms in the bracket are Quadrant I in table 1, i.e. the benchmark that reflects the fund’s 
asset allocation. The left hand side (i.e.,    ) is the fund’s actual return, i.e., Quadrant IV. The 
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difference between Quadrant IV and Quadrant I is security selection and market timing, or 
simply just excess return. The variables are defined as follows:  
      =  Mutual fund m’s actual return in period T 
       =  Asset class i‟s passive return in period T 
      =  Mutual fund m’s policy weight for asset class i 
    =  Mutual fund m’s return from security selection in period T 
     =  Mutual fund m’s return from market timing in period T 
 
Let us not stop with expression (2). Assuming we have the actual weights and the passive 
returns for the n predefined asset classes, we can formulate the return of mutual fund m in 
period T in our setting differently:  
(3)                   
 
          
where            for i=1…n, and        
 
    1. 
The terms in the bracket are Quadrant II in table 1, and the left hand side is Quadrant IV. 
       is mutual fund m’s actual weight in asset class i in period T. 
 
The combination of expression (2) and (3) gives us the mathematical definition of market 
timing:  
(4)                    
 
   
       
From this formula, it becomes clear that market timing stems from the strategic under or 
overweighting of an asset class relative to its policy weight.  
 
Clearly, equation (2) and (3) are formulations that can be used in this chapter to measure a 
mutual fund’s security selection and market timing. However, to do these calculations, we 
need the following inputs:  
1) n predefined asset classes that constitute our benchmark  
2) The actual and policy weights of the predefined asset classes 
One way of finding the actual and policy weights is to use Portfolio Based Style Analysis. As 
mentioned, this is an approach in which the characteristics of a fund over a period of time are 
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derived from the characteristics of the securities it contains at various points in time. The 
problem with this approach is that the time and cost with making and maintaining such a 
database is high. Sharpe’s Return Based Style Analysis (1992) might in this matter serve as a 
better alternative. Before we look into the details of this model, we will use the next section to 
suggest what asset classes can constitute a benchmark for Norwegian mutual funds that focus 
on Norwegian equity. 
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1.3. The Asset Classes Constituting our Benchmark 
In order to be able to use the generalized BHB-framework to solve our problem statements, 
we will need a certain number of adequate asset classes that constitute our benchmark. Sharpe 
(1992) argues that when making a benchmark, it is desirable that the asset classes which are 
used are i) mutually exclusive, ii) exhaustive, and iii) have returns that “differ”. In other 
words, a security should not be included in more than one asset class, as many securities as 
possible should be included in the chosen asset classes, and the asset classes should have low 
correlation.  
 
In this section we will look at asset classes that fulfill as many of Sharpe’s objectives as 
possible, and can constitute a suitable benchmark for active Norwegian mutual funds that 
focus on Norwegian equity. We start by describing a common way of categorizing asset 
classes, namely styles.  
1.3.1. Style Investing 
When making portfolio allocation decisions, many investors first categorize assets into broad 
classes and then decide how to allocate their funds across these various asset classes. The 
asset classes that investors use in this process are sometimes called styles, and the process 
itself is known as style investing. Assets in a style usually share common characteristics which 
can be based in law (e.g., government bonds), markets (e.g., value and growth) or in 
fundamentals (e.g., commodities) (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003).  
 
One very broad style could be domestic equity. In general, Norwegian mutual funds that 
associate themselves with the domestic equity style invest over 80% of their assets in 
Norway.
8
 In this matter, it might be sensible to categorize domestic equity into more distinct 
styles. The most popular styles that share common characteristics in the equity market are 
value, growth and market capitalization.   
 
A growth investor has an approach focusing on earnings change, and may focus his or her 
attention on forecasting future earnings streams, with less attention to current price. A value 
                                                          
8
 In order to be classified in one particular group (such as e.g., domestic mutual fund), the general rule is that the 
fund’s investment mandate should state that at least 80% of the fund’s assets are to be exposed within the 
investment universe the fund identifies itself with (Norwegian Fund and Asset Management Association)  
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investor will focus on dividend yield and/or price/earnings (P/E), and will look for relatively 
cheap or high yielding stocks, while paying less attention to a company’s earnings prospects 
(Gerber, 1994). In other words, growth investors look for stocks with superior anticipated 
earnings growth while value investors look for undervalued stocks. Table 3 summarizes some 
of the typical attributes associated with these styles: 
TABLE 3: 
Characteristics of Growth and Value Style 
 
 
Another popular way of categorizing equity is by market capitalization. Typical 
categorizations could be small-capitalization stocks (hereafter small-caps), mid-capitalization 
stocks (hereafter mid-caps) and large-capitalization stocks (hereafter large-caps).  
 
Using U.S. data, Fama and French (1993) find that value stocks tend to outperform growth 
stocks, whereas Banz (1981) finds that small-caps have historically earned higher returns than 
large-caps. Based on these empirical anomalies, Fama and French (1993) construct a three-
factor model to explain the difference in cross-sectional return of U.S. equity.
9
 It would be 
interesting to see whether these empirical anomalies apply to the Norwegian equity market as 
well. Say we decompose the Norwegian equity market into 5 styles: small-caps (S), mid-caps 
growth (MG), mid-caps value (MV), large-caps growth (LG) and large-caps value (LV). By 
using MSCI’s Norwegian equity style-indices from 1995 to 2010, 10  we get the yearly 
performance in each style as given by Table 4:  
 
                                                          
9
 The 1
st
 factor is the market risk premium 
10
 MSCI define value stocks using book value to price ratio, 12-months forward earnings to price ratio and 
dividend yield. Growth stocks are defined using long-term forward earnings per share (EPS) growth rate, short-
term forward EPS growth rate, current internal growth rate, long-term historical EPS growth trend and long-term 
historical sales per share growth trend. The MSCI Small Cap Indices cover all investable small cap securities 
with a market capitalization below that of the companies in the MSCI Standard Indices. The MSCI Mid Cap 
Indices cover all investable mid cap securities, whereas the MSCI Large Cap Indices cover all investable large 
cap securities (MSCI, 2011) 
Growth Value
High historical earnings High dividend yield
High expected earnings High book/price ratio
High relative change in Low current P/E relative to
        expected earnings         historical P/E
Source: Gerber (1994) 
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TABLE 4: 
Annual Returns: 5 Styles using MSCI’s Indices. Period: 1995-2010 
 
 
The variability in return across the five styles from year-to-year is far greater than would have 
been encountered if groups with similar numbers of securities had been formed randomly. 
Just as in the U.S. equity market, small-caps perform better than large-caps on average, and 
value stocks do better than growth stocks. The table shows that the spread between the worst 
and the best performing asset class is on average over 50 percentage-points; in fact, in some 
periods the difference is close to or above 100 percentage-points. Hence, there is much to gain 
from choosing the right asset classes.  
 
The results in Table 4 show that the risk (measured by arithmetic average yearly standard 
deviation) of the different styles vary substantially. Mid-caps growth stocks and small caps 
Year S MG MV LG LV
High-Low 
Spread
1995 -1.6 % 11.3 % 4.5 % 3.3 % -34.6 % 45.9 %
1996 27.3 % 19.7 % 33.9 % 34.8 % -60.7 % 95.5 %
1997 15.0 % 15.5 % 50.1 % 8.9 % -0.6 % 50.7 %
1998 -25.3 % -33.3 % -27.9 % -2.4 % -27.2 % 30.9 %
1999 58.1 % 30.8 % 47.2 % 5.8 % 31.1 % 52.3 %
2000 -9.4 % 5.4 % 19.4 % -24.7 % 9.9 % 44.1 %
2001 -19.1 % -31.2 % -20.1 % -10.2 % 0.3 % 31.6 %
2002 -54.9 % -33.8 % -24.2 % -31.6 % -15.5 % 39.4 %
2003 49.2 % 94.4 % 36.8 % -4.2 % 30.3 % 98.5 %
2004 52.5 % -62.2 % 37.8 % -26.8 % 30.2 % 114.7 %
2005 52.1 % 24.7 % 34.7 % 21.3 % 44.2 % 30.8 %
2006 32.5 % 14.1 % 31.4 % 30.6 % 34.8 % 20.7 %
2007 -2.2 % 21.8 % 48.8 % 9.9 % 6.5 % 50.9 %
2008 -55.7 % -67.6 % -35.2 % -55.3 % -49.9 % 32.4 %
2009 84.6 % 59.4 % 55.1 % 55.7 % 45.0 % 39.6 %
2010 27.2 % 4.6 % 41.6 % 23.8 % 6.0 % 37.0 %
Arithmetic 
Average 
Yearly 
Return
14.4 % 4.6 % 20.9 % 2.4 % 3.1 % 50.9 %
Arithmetic 
Average 
Yearly 
Standard 
Deviation
40.9 % 42.3 % 31.0 % 28.2 % 33.0 %
Source: Datastream and own analysis
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stocks have been most volatile the last 16 years, and are around 10 percentage-points more 
volatile than mid-caps value stocks, large-caps growth stocks and large-caps value stocks.  
 
We now touch upon a point that is important to stress. The manager who specializes to be 
e.g., a small-caps manager in the long run, is responsible for stock selection and market 
timing within the small-caps universe. If small-caps stocks are out of favor and underperform 
the overall market, a manager can still outperform the small-caps market. However, for us to 
be able to measure this, we need a benchmark that reflects the mutual fund’s true long-run 
risk. Fortunately, this is accounted for in the generalized BHB-framework, since the 
benchmark is determined by mutual fund’s asset allocation. The fact that the small-caps 
stocks underperform the market is the investor’s responsibility, and not the manager’s, since 
the investor chooses to bet on the particular style that follows with the asset allocation.
11
  
 
In Norway, most mutual funds use the Oslo Børs Mutual Fund Index (OSEFX) as their 
benchmark. If the components of OSEFX do not reflect the fund’s asset allocation, this can 
induce moral hazard. To illustrate why, assume we study a mutual fund that does not utilize 
security selection or market timing.  Provided that financial theory works, the manager only 
needs to increase the fund’s risk to beat the benchmark on average. Recall that return 
associated with the fund’s asset allocation is the investor’s responsibility. If the fund claims 
that the benchmark reflects the fund’s long-term risk, the investor will believe that the return 
that is created in excess of the benchmark is security selection and/or market timing. In reality 
it is just the payoff from extra risk in the mutual fund. 
 
Based on the above arguments, it might make more sense to tailor-make a benchmark for each 
fund. In the next subsection we suggest what asset classes can be used to constitute a tailor-
made benchmark for active Norwegian mutual funds.  
1.3.2.  Asset Classes for Norwegian Mutual Funds 
For illustrational purposes, we will look at Norwegian mutual funds that focus on the 
Norwegian equity market. Although these mutual funds invest the majority of their assets in 
Norway, most have the ability to invest parts of their assets abroad. Therefore our benchmark 
                                                          
11
 Of course, this is under the weak assumption that the companies managing the mutual funds are just providers 
of mutual funds, not sellers/advisors  
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should include European and world equity indices. It would also have been desirable to 
include corporate bonds, but unfortunately, there are no Norwegian corporate bond indices. In 
order to capture the different styles that exist internally within Norwegian equity, we use the 5 
indices we saw in the previous subsection.  
 
A possible way of categorizing Norwegian Mutual fund’s investable universe might be as 
follows: bills, intermediate and long-term government bonds, Norwegian equities (5 styles), 
European equities (excluding Norwegian equities), and world equities (excluding European 
equities). Table 5 describes the ten asset classes and the indices we use for the associated 
passive return series: 
TABLE 5: 
Asset Classes Constituting Benchmark for Norwegian Mutual Funds 
 
 
These time-series are collected via DataStream. Table 6 shows the correlation between these:  
 
Small-Caps (S) World, ex. Europe (W)
Mid-Caps Growth (MG) Europe, ex. Norway (E)
Mid-Caps Value (MV) 3 M
Large-Caps Growth (LG) 3 Y
Large-Caps Value (LV) 10 Y
*US price-index manually adjusted to NOK price-index
Asset: Intermediate-Term Government bonds
Index: Norway Benchmark 3 Year
Asset: Long-Term Government bonds
Index: Norway Benchmark 10 Year
Asset: World Stocks excluding European 
Stocks
Index: MSCI World ex. Europe*
Asset: European Stocks excluding Norwegian 
Stocks
Index: MSCI Europe ex. Norway*
Asset: Cash-equivalents with less than 3 
months to maturity
Index: Norway Interbank 3 Month until 
08.01.2003 as proxy for Norway t-bill 3 month. 
Thereafter actual Norway t-bill 3 month. 
Asset: Norwegian Mid Growth Capitalization 
Stocks
Index: MSCI Norway Mid Growth 
Capitalization*
Asset: Norwegian Mid Value Capitalization 
Stocks
Index: MSCI Norway Mid Value 
Capitalization*
Asset: Norwegian Large Growth 
Capitalization Stocks
Index: MSCI Norway Large Growth 
Capitalization*
Asset: Norwegian Large Value 
Capitalization Stocks
Index: MSCI Norway Large Value  
Capitalization*
Asset: Norwegian Small Capitalization 
Stocks
Index: MSCI Norway Small Capitalization* 
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TABLE 6: 
Return Correlation. Period: January 1995 – December 2010 (monthly observations) 
 
We note that a few of these asset classes are highly correlated; especially the cash-equivalents 
and the bonds. Thus, Sharpe’s criteria of having asset classes that “differ” might be violated in 
this case. We will later see what problems this can potentially cause.   
1.3.3. Section Summary 
In this section we have found 10 asset classes that can constitute a benchmark for Norwegian 
mutual funds, as well as 10 associated passive return series. In order to estimate a fund’s 
security selection and market timing, we still need a method of estimating the policy and 
actual weights of these predefined asset classes. Hence, we will now look into Sharpe’s 
infamous model from 1992.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S MG MV LG LV W E 3 M 3 Y
Small-Caps (S)
Mid-Caps Growth (MG) 49.6 %
Mid-Caps Value (MV) 68.7 % 56.1 %
Large-Caps Growth (LG) 45.8 % 35.8 % 34.1 %
Large-Caps Value (LV) 53.7 % 39.6 % 46.2 % 38.4 %
World, ex. Europe (W) 56.7 % 42.4 % 45.9 % 38.9 % 33.4 %
Europe, ex. Norway (E) 66.0 % 45.7 % 57.0 % 45.8 % 41.5 % 83.7 %
3 M -32.3 % -11.5 % -21.5 % -17.2 % -16.6 % -13.9 % -21.7 %
3 Y -27.8 % -5.5 % -16.6 % -14.0 % -16.4 % -13.8 % -15.3 % 91.0 %
10 Y -18.1 % -1.1 % -12.5 % -7.3 % -17.3 % -6.6 % -4.5 % 70.0 % 88.9 %
23 
 
1.4. Estimating a Mutual Fund’s Weights using Return Based Style 
Analysis 
In this section, we will look into a model which can potentially help us estimate a mutual 
fund’s actual (      ) and policy (    ) weights; namely Sharpe’s Return Based Style 
Analysis (hereafter RBSA). In this section we will describe the general model, its assumptions 
and its underlying properties, before we describe how it can be used in the generalized BHB-
framework in the next section. This model has its foundation in a general multifactor-model; 
hence, in the next subsection, we give a short introduction of what multifactor-models are.  
1.4.1. Multifactor-Models 
Multifactor-models are a broad family of econometric models. Essentially, a multivariate 
process admits a multifactor representation if it can be approximately expressed as a function 
of another multivariate process of a smaller dimensionality. The general multifactor 
formulation of a model has to be clearly distinguished from the economic theory that might be 
behind it. In fact, multifactor models might be the expression of an economic theory as well 
as the result of an explicit econometric dimensionality reduction process (Focardi and 
Fabozzi, 2004). For instance, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965 
and Mossin, 1966), the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross, 1976) and the Intertemporal Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (Merton, 1973) are economic theories which happen to be expressed as 
factor models.  This is however, not the general trend. In general, the process is purely 
statistical and not supported by theory. RBSA is an example of the latter.  
 
As previously mentioned, the traditional view of asset allocation assumes that when investors 
place their money in mutual funds, the money will be diversified across many different asset 
classes. Hence, we are ultimately interested in the mutual fund’s exposures to key asset 
classes. Given, say, v monthly realized returns on a mutual fund, along with comparable 
returns for a selected set of asset classes, one could simply use a multiple regression analysis 
with mutual fund returns as the dependent variable and asset class returns as the independent 
variables (Sharpe, 1992). Under certain statistical assumptions, which we soon will touch 
upon, the resulting slope coefficient can then be interpreted as the mutual fund’s historic 
proportion in the asset classes. Equation (5) is an example of such a regression: 
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(5)                  
 
   
   ;    t = T-v, T-v+1,… ,T-1 
where the variables and coefficients are as follows: 
     =  Mutual fund m’s actual return in period t 
    =  Mutual fund m’s constant specific
12
 
     =  Mutual fund m’s sensitivity to asset class i 
      =  Asset class i‟s passive return in period t 
     =  Noise 
 
We define the sum of the noise and mutual fund m’s constant specific as the tracking error, 
and denote it    . Hence, model (5) simplifies to:  
(6)             
 
   
    ;    t = T-v, T-v+1,… ,T-1 
Sharpe sets      months in his analysis. However, in the first round we will stick to a 
generalized model. We define        
 
   
 as the asset class portfolio series. In order to 
estimate the sensitivities in model (6), we could use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). This 
method minimizes the sum of square residuals, and is by far the most popular estimation 
method. We denote the estimated sensitivities as      for i = 1 to n. For OLS to give unbiased 
estimates of the sensitivities, i.e.,             for i = 1 to n, the following 3 assumptions 
have to hold (Woolridge, 2009):  
a) The mutual fund’s return-process follows a model that is linear in its parameters 
b) In the sample (and therefore in the underlying time series process), no independent 
variable is constant nor a perfect linear combination of the other independent variables 
c) For each t, the expected value of the noise, given the explanatory variables for all time 
periods, is zero. Mathematically,                               = 0 for t = T-v, T-
v+1,… , T-1 
The above assumptions say nothing about the efficiency of the estimated sensitivities. The 
following assumptions deal with this: 
                                                          
12
 Note that Sharpe does not mention the fund’s constant specific in his paper at all, and just starts with equation 
(6) 
25 
 
d) Conditional on the explanatory variables for all time periods, the variance of the noise 
is the same for each t. Mathematically,               
  for t = T-v, T-v+1,… , T-1 
(i.e., noise process is homoscedastic) 
e) Conditional on the explanatory variables for all time periods, the noise in two different 
time periods are uncorrelated for each t. Mathematically,                  
              (i.e., no autocorrelation) 
Assumptions a) – e) ensure that OLS estimators are the best linear, unbiased estimators 
conditional on the explanatory variables for all time periods. In order to do inference and 
estimation, the previous assumptions with the addition of the following assumption have to 
hold:  
f) For each t, the noise     is independent of the explanatory variables for all time periods 
and is independently and identically distributed as         
Note that assumption f) implies assumption c), d) and e). Under assumption f), t statistics can 
be used for testing statistical significance of individual explanatory variables, and F statistics 
can be used to test for joint significance.  
 
Equation (6) is a static, linear regression model, where both mutual fund returns and asset 
class returns are assumed to be stationary stochastic processes. A stochastic process is a 
sequence of random variables indexed by time (Woolridge), as indicated by the tildes in 
model (6). Formally, a stochastic process                having a finite mean and 
variance is covariance-stationary if for all t and t-s,  
                
                   
  
                
This implies that we have to assume that the mutual fund returns and asset class returns have a 
constant mean, constant variance and time-invariant covariance in order to run them on model 
(6). We say that a stationary process is integrated of order 0. A process that is not stationary, 
but needs to be differentiated n times to get stationary, is said to be integrated of order n. 
Moreover, a process that is not stationary is to said to be unit root. 
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To sum up: if we assume that the 10 predefined asset classes (cf. Table 5, pg. 21) are not 
constant nor linear combinations of each other, we will get unbiased estimates of the fund’s 
historic proportions in the asset classes as long as the mutual fund and asset class return-series 
are stationary, and that for each t, the expected value of the noise, given the explanatory 
variables for all time periods, is zero. 
1.4.2. From Linear Regression to Quadratic Programming 
In this subsection we will illustrate how we go from linear regression to the technique used in 
RBSA: quadratic programming. In this matter, we will use the 10 asset classes and their 
associated indices (as defined in Table 5) as passive return-series. These series run from 1995 
to 2010. Before these return series can be used in model (6), we have to ensure that they are 
stationary. In appendix B, we test the ten asset classes for unit root using a Dickey Fuller test. 
The result suggests that all asset classes except for bills (3M) and bonds (3Y and 10Y) are 
stationary. In cases where the dependent and the independent variable are integrated of 
different orders, regression analysis gives meaningless results (Enders, 2010).
13
 
 
In the long run, it is realistic to assume that interest rates have a constant mean, constant 
variance and time-invariant covariance, simply because they cannot increase or decrease 
infinitely. This would imply that bills and bonds are stationary. The main reason for why the 
Dickey Fuller test suggests that bills and bonds are unit root is due to the fact that interest-
rates have mainly just decreased in the period under study. Because business cycles may take 
more than 15 years to finish, we would probably get a different picture if we had used longer 
time-series. Based on these arguments, we chose to include bills and bonds in the regression.
14
 
 
Table 7 illustrates the steps from linear regression to quadratic programming using the 
Norwegian mutual fund DnB Nor Norge (I) as example.
15
 We use DnB Nor Norge (I)’s 
monthly returns from January 2001 through December 2010 as the dependent variable (i.e., 
                                                          
13
 This situation seemingly arises if the mutual fund’s return-series is stationary. This is also referred to as 
“nonsense regression”. This should not be confused with “spurious regression”. Spurious regression is a situation 
where the estimates appear to be significant, but the results are without any economic meaning. This situation 
arises when the dependent variable is integrated of the same order as the independent variable and where the 
residual sequence contains a stochastic trend 
14
 This is also done in Sharpe’s analysis (1992) 
15
 For a description of how DnB Nor Norge (I)’s return-series are calculated, see subsection 1.6.1. Appendix E 
shows that DnB Nor Norge (I)’s return-series is stationary 
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     ), with the corresponding returns for the ten previously defined indices serving as 
independent variables.  
TABLE 7:  
Regression and Quadratic Programming Results 
DnB Nor Norge (I). Period: January 2001 – December 2010 
 
The column entitled “Unconstrained Regression” shows the results obtained when applying 
equation (6) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
 
The first ten rows show the estimated 
sensitivities (i.e.,         ), expressed as percentages. A few of these are significant at a 1% 
level.
16
 The sensitivities associated with bills and bonds are suspiciously high, although not 
significantly different from 0. The sum of the coefficients is shown after the first ten rows, 
followed by the   . A substantial portion (93.93%) of the monthly variance in the fund’s 
returns is explained by the ten asset classes.  
 
Recall that we restrict ourselves to use analyze Norwegian mutual funds that only have long 
positions in the asset classes, and where 100% of the money is invested in the 10 asset classes 
over time. However, in the unconstrained regression, the coefficients do not sum to 100%, but 
to 389%. Furthermore, several of the coefficients are inconsistent with the mutual fund’s 
                                                          
16
 If we assume that for each t, the noise     is independent of the explanatory variables for all time periods and is 
independently and identically distributed as        ,  t and F statistics can be used 
Constrained 
Regression
Quadratic 
Programming
Small Cap (S) 37 % ** 36 % 38 %
Mid Cap Growth (MG) 6 % ** 6 % 6 %
Mid Cap Value (MV) 13 % ** 13 % 13 %
Large Cap Growth (LG) 4 % 3 % 3 %
Large Cap Value (LV) 34 % ** 35 % 34 %
World, ex. Europe (W) -4 % -5 % 0 %
Europe, ex. Norway (E) 14 % 15 % 5 %
3 M -244 % -66 % 0 %
3 Y 198 % 47 % 0 %
10 Y 331 % 15 % 0 %
Total 389 % 100 % 100 %
R-squared 93.93 % 93.87 % 93.72 %
** Significant at a 1 %  level
*   Significant at a 5 %  level
Regression and Quadratic Programming Results
DnB Nor (I), Januar 2001- December 2010
Unconstrained 
Regression
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actual policy not to have short positions in the asset classes.
17
 Hence, the results are not 
sensible in our setting.  
 
The column titled “Constrained Regression” reports the results of a multiple regression 
analysis similar to the first, but with one added constraint: the coefficients are required to sum 
to 100%. The reduction in    is slight (from 93.93% to 93.87%), but the inconsistency 
between the coefficients and the fund's investment policy still remains, since several of the 
sensitivities are negative.  
 
The last column entitled “Quadratic Programming” reports the results of an analysis where 
each coefficient is constrained to lie between 0% – 100% and the sum is again required to be 
100%. This causes    to decrease slightly to 93.72%. Nevertheless, the coefficients now 
conform more closely to the reality of the fund’s investment style, making the resulting 
characterization more likely to provide meaningful results with out-of-sample data. This 
method, proposed by Sharp in 1992, has become known as Return Based Style Analysis. In 
the next subsection, we will look into the details of this method.  
1.4.3. Return Based Style Analysis 
The example with DnB Nor Norge (I) shows that by adding constraints reflecting minimal 
information about what investments the fund actually makes, one can obtain greatly improved 
results. Let us take a closer look at how we get the coefficients associated with the column 
entitled “Quadratic Programming” in table 7. If we re-arrange model (6), we get an expression 
for the tracking-error: 
(7)                   
 
   ;    t = T-v, T-v+1,… ,T-1 
In order to get results that conform closely to the reality of a fund’s investment style, Sharp 
argues that we should infer as much as possible about a fund’s sensitivities to the variations in 
the return of the predefined asset classes during the period studied (we will get back to a 
geometric interpretation of what Sharp means with this later). If we assume that the stochastic 
                                                          
17
 It should be noted that DnB Nor Norge (I) has limited ability to go short in securities through the use of 
derivatives. Furthermore, they have small amounts of debt in their portfolio (Source: DnB NOR). However, for 
simplicity, this is ignored 
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processes in (7) are stationary, we can find such sensitivities by minimizing the variance of 
the tracking error for each   with respect to the sensitivities: 
(8)                                           
where 
                     
              
          
 
                           
 
      
   
    
                   
 
    
In order to apply Sharpe’s method on our dataset, we replace the theoretical moments with the 
empirical moments. Under the assumption that the stochastic processes are stationary, the 
mean, variance and autocorrelations can usually be well-approximated by sufficiently long 
time averages based on the single set of realizations (Enders, 2010). Using return-series for  
t= T-v, T-v+1,… ,T-1, we denote the empirical moments as follows: 
 Sample mean return of mutual fund m: 
    
 
 
     
   
     
 
 Sample mean return of asset class i:   
         
 
 
      
   
     
 
 (Unbiased) Sample variance of mutual fund m:  
  
  
 
   
          
 
   
     
 
 (Unbiased) Sample variance of asset class i:  
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 (Unbiased) Sample covariance between asset classes i and j:  
      
 
   
                              
   
     
 
 (Unbiased) Sample covariance between mutual fund m and asset class i: 
     
 
   
                        
   
     
 
We define the sample variance of the tracking error as   . If we replace          by   
 , 
          by    
 ,                by       and               by       our problem 
becomes as follows:  
(9)                           
where 
      
      
    
  
                  
 
      
   
            
 
    
We can now add the constraints stating that the sensitivities are to lie between 0% – 100% and 
that the sum of the sensitivities is required to be 100%. Based on the constraints, we can get 
estimates of the sensitivities by solving the following problem: 
(10)                                     
    
 
   =1 
      , i=1…n 
where 
       
      
    
  
                  
 
      
   
            
 
    
The presence of a non-negativity constraint for the sensitivities implies that problem (10) 
cannot be solved with regression analysis, but requires the use of a numerical method to solve 
it. In the column entitled “Quadratic Programming” in table 7, we have used MATLAB’s 
quadratic programming algorithm in a coding made by Andreas Steiner (available through the 
MATLAB central) to solve the problem.
18
 The name “Quadratic Programming” comes from 
the fact that the objective function is quadratic and the constraints are linear. Because we have 
used styles to categorize the asset classes, the sensitivities are simply referred to as style-
                                                          
18
 Sharpe uses the gradient method. For referees, see Sharpe (1987). For an exact solution, one can implement 
Markowitz’ critical line method (see Markowitz, 1987) 
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weights.
19
 Since the method only uses return-series, it is referred to as return based style 
analysis, or simply just style-analysis.  
 
Let us now return back to equation (8). If we assuming that            = 0 for t = T-v, T-
v+1,… , T-1, we can rewrite the term                   
 
    as follows:
20
 
                  
 
   
      
          
 
   
                        
 
     
   
   
 
Inserting this into (8), we can the problem: 
(11)                                           
where 
                       
          
 
    -                       
 
     
   
    
 
As before, we replace the theoretical moments with the empirical moments. Thus, problem 
(11) becomes as follows: 
(12)                     
where 
       
      
    
  
                  
 
     
   
    
If            = 0 for t = T-v, T-v+1,… , T-1, formulation (9) and (12) will be equal. However, 
in the presence of the non-negativity constraint on the style-weights, the estimated noise 
process is likely to be correlated with some of the return-series of the asset classes (Sharpe, 
1992). This will make formulation (9) and (12) different. It is important to note that RBSA 
has a foundation in formulation (9), and not (12).  
 
Until now we have interpreted the sensitivities as historic proportions in the asset classes. 
Unfortunately, the consequence of correlation between the estimated noise process and return-
series of the asset classes is that we cannot make correct estimates of the historic proportions 
of total assets invested in the individual asset classes. Nevertheless, because we minimize the 
                                                          
19
 Sharpe simply uses the term “weights” 
20
 We replace     by        
 
   
    ; 
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variance of the tracking error for each t, the style-weights still have an interpretation. In the 
next subsection, we will look at how we should interpret the style-weights.  
 
Failure of statistical assumptions means that conventional tests of statistical significance 
invoked to evaluate the likely performance of the model are violated, which makes true out-
of-sample tests the only reliable means of evaluating the efficacy of the approach. However, 
in subsection 1.5.6., we will see that it is possible to approximate the confidence intervals of 
the style-weights.  
1.4.4. The Duck Theorem 
Sharpe argues that the best sets of sensitivities are the ones where the variance of the tracking 
error for each t is the least. In this subsection we will analyze why this method is preferred 
and how we should interpret the style-weights when we use this method.  
 
Consider the extreme case, where the variance of the tracking error for each t equals zero. 
This is only true if the difference between the mutual fund’s return series and the asset class 
portfolio series              
 
   
  is constant for each t, meaning that the return-series run 
parallel in each of the v months under investigation. For each  , where           
       , the following statements are equivalent: 
                     
  
            
 
   
    
In this optimal case, the asset class portfolio series resemble the exact shape of the mutual 
fund’s return series, with the tracking error resulting in a constant addition or subtraction of 
the value over the asset class portfolio series. Unfortunately, the constraints in problem (10) 
make this situation highly unlikely to occur in practice.  
 
In more regular situations, RBSA determines the style-weights in such a way that the asset 
class portfolio series is able to closely resemble the behavior of the mutual fund’s return series 
for each t, with the tracking error resulting in a near-constant addition or subtraction of the 
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value over the asset class portfolio series for each t. This is what Sharpe means when he 
emphasizes that the goal of his analysis is infer as much as possible about the mutual fund’s 
sensitivities to the variations in the return of the predefined asset classes during the period 
studied. Note that the objective of RBSA is not to minimize the average value of the 
difference between the mutual fund’s return series and that of the asset class portfolio series; 
neither does it aim to minimize the sum of the squared differences. Such methods would yield 
a very different geometric interpretation, as they would try to make the asset class portfolio 
series as close to the mutual fund’s return series as possible. In other words, such methods 
would “make the fund look bad” (or good) (Sharpe, 1992). Figure 1 illustrates the difference 
between RBSA and methods that try to closely fit the asset class portfolio series to the mutual 
fund’s return series:21 
FIGURE 1: 
RBSA versus closely fit methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Thomas Becker (2003) 
 
To sum up: the implication of correlation between the estimated noise process and the return-
series of the asset classes is that we cannot interpret the estimated style-weight      as the 
proportion of total assets invested in asset class i in the period t = T-v to T-1. However, 
because we minimize the variance of the tracking error for each t, the estimated style-weight 
can be interpreted as a weight that reflects the fund’s behavior in asset class i in the period t = 
T-v to T-1. Hence, the style-weights have an interpretation.  
 
                                                          
21
 RBSA uses discrete sequences of returns in the discrete time--period T-v … to T-1. However, for illustrational 
purposes, the graph assumes continues sequences of return in a continuous time-period from T-v to T-1 
Return 
Time 
 
Alpha + Noise Process 
Mutual fund return series 
Asset class portfolio series using RBSA 
Asset class portfolio series using closely fit methods 
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In table 7, RBSA shows that DnB Nor Norge (I) has an exposure of 37.8% in small-caps, 
6.2% in mid-caps growth, 13.1% in mid-caps value, 3.2% in large-caps growth, 34.4% in 
large-caps value and 5.3% in European stocks. The correlation between the estimated tracking 
error and the return-series of the asset classes implies that the estimates are likely to biased. 
Therefore we cannot interpret them as the mutual fund’s proportions in the asset classes over 
the 10 year period. Nevertheless, what we get from the analysis is that DnB Nor Norge (I) 
behaves as if it invests in 37.8% small-caps, 6.2% mid-caps, …, etc. To phrase it as Sharpe 
does: “if it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, for all important purposes, it is a duck” 
(1995).  
1.4.5. Evaluating the Asset Classes 
Once the styles-weights have been estimated, we can evaluate the efficacy of the asset classes 
by measuring the portion of the variance of mutual fund m’s return that is explained by the 
predefined asset classes: 
(13)    
  
   
     
  
    
     
  
  
where   
  = sample variance of mutual fund m and    = sample variance of the tracking error. 
 
Note that    comes from the formulation in problem (9), and not problem (12). In the case 
with DnB Nor Norge (I),    
          It is important to recognize that (13) indicates only 
the extent to which a specific model fits the data at hand. A better test of the usefulness of any 
implementation is its ability to explain performance out-of-sample.  
1.4.6. An Investor’s Effective Asset Mix 
When we have estimated the styles-weights of the individual mutual funds, one can easily 
estimate the effective asset mix when using multiple mutual funds. Let    represent the 
proportion of the investor’s portfolio invested in mutual fund m, then the overall portfolio 
return at time t is:  
(14)                 
Now model (6) can be inserted in (14) to yield the following linear relationship:  
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(15)                                                   
          
 
Now           is the portfolio’s exposure to the asset class i. Sharpe notes that when the 
tracking errors across the different managers are uncorrelated, diversification across different 
fund managers will substantially reduce the variance of the aggregate non-style components 
and thus increase the proportion of the variance attributable to asset class selection. Even if 
some tracking errors are correlated, the use of multiple fund managers will often lead to a 
large reduction in the aggregate non-style components.  
1.4.7. Approximating the Confidence Intervals for the Style-Weights 
Since the non-negativity constraint in problem (10) generally causes the noise process to be 
correlated with the return-series of the asset classes, we cannot get a closed form expression 
of the confidence interval. However, an approximation made by Lobosco and DiBartolomeo 
(1997) helps us understand what factors affect the confidence-interval of the style-weights. 
Consider the extent to which the estimated style-weights do not match the true style-weights:  
               
where: 
      = Mutual fund m’s estimated style-weight for asset class i 
     =  Mutual fund m’s (true) style-weight for asset class i 
      =  Amount of error in mutual fund m’s estimated style-weight for  
asset class i 
As argued previously,      represents a weight that reflects the fund’s behavior in asset class i 
in the period t = T-v to T-1. Lobosco and DiBartolomeo show that the standard deviation of 
the estimated weight can be approximated by the following formula:  
(16)       
  
         
 
where:    
    =  Standard deviation of the estimated tracking error        in the period  
t = T-v…T-1 (observable). We let   be an abbreviation of      
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     =  Standard deviation of asset class i’s return series not being attributable
   to the other asset classes in period t = T-v…T-1 (observable) 
v  =  Length of the return series  
k  =  Number of asset classes with nonzero style-weights 
 
For the proof of this formula and how we can measure    , see Appendix C. The problem 
with this method is that it is only valid in the special case when none of the weights are either 
zero or 1. This is because the formula is based on Taylor expansions, which cannot be used to 
obtain asymptotic distributions of the style-weights on the boundary of the parameter space.  
Kim, White and Stone (2005) propose a method that accounts for this. However, for 
illustrative purposes, Lobosco and DiBartolomeo’s formula is suitable for us. From the 
formula, one can see that the confidence interval for a style-weight increases if:  
a) The standard deviation of the estimated tracking error (   ) increases 
b) The length of the return series (v) decreases 
c) The “independence” of asset class i from the other asset classes       decreases 
 
Point a) was thoroughly illustrated in subsection 1.4.4.: when the shape of a manager’s return-
series is perfectly mimicked, the variance of the tracking error for each t is zero. In this case 
the estimated style-weight is exactly the same as the true style-weight.
22
 
 
As point b) shows, increasing the number of returns used decreases the standard deviation of 
the estimated weight. However, as we will see in the next section, this will also affect the 
interpretation of the style-weights.  
 
Point c) is an important point to thoroughly investigate. As an example of how things can go 
wrong, consider convertible bonds. A convertible bond has the characteristics of both bonds 
and stocks, implying that convertible bonds are dependent on bond and stock return. From 
equation (16) we see that the inclusion of convertible bond would increase the style-weight’s 
standard deviation due to the low value of                     . This means that style-analysis 
can only reliably attribute portfolio returns to the portions of the asset class return that are 
themselves not attributable to the returns of the other asset classes (Lobosco and 
DiBartolomeo, 1997).  
                                                          
22
 In fact, in this special situation, the estimated weights are the fund’s proportions in the asset classes 
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It could be argued that mid-capitalization stocks are a combination of small-capitalization 
stocks and large-capitalization stocks. Table 4 shows that mid-caps growth stocks do indeed 
have smaller average return than small-caps stocks, and larger average return than large-caps 
growth stocks; making it a linear combination of the two. On the other side, we see that mid-
caps value stocks have larger average return than both small-caps and large-cap value stocks. 
Based on this, mid-caps stocks are not a direct linear combination of small caps stocks and 
large-cap stocks.  
 
We might also expect that the high correlation between bonds and bills will cause the 
confidence intervals of bonds and bills to increase and that RBSA will have trouble seeing the 
difference between these asset classes. However, in general, the 10 asset classes we have 
included seem to be suitable for illustrational purposes.  
 
1.4.8. Section Summary 
In this section, we have reviewed RBSA. We have seen how RBSA originates from 
multifactor-models, how we should interpret the style-weights and we have looked at the 
factors that affect the confidence interval of style-weights. In the next section we will use 
RBSA in the generalized BHB-framework to estimate a mutual fund’s actual (      ) and 
policy (      weights in our 10 asset classes.  
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1.5. Combining Style-Analysis and the BHB-framework  
In this section, we will see that by using RBSA in two-steps, we will be able to estimate two 
sets of weights that are closely related to a fund’s actual and policy weights. This will enable 
us to use the generalized BHB-framework to estimate a mutual fund’s security selection and 
market timing.  
1.5.1.  A Two-Step Approach using RBSA 
In the previous section, we reviewed RBSA because we need a method that can help us 
estimate the actual and policy weights in a set of asset classes. In the generalized BHB-
framework, we define the policy weights to be the long-term proportions placed in particular 
classes of investments, whereas the actual weights are the mutual fund’s proportions placed in 
particular classes of investments in the beginning of the current period.  
 
Unfortunately, by using RBSA, the style-weights do not represent proportions anymore, but 
weights that mimic the behavior of the mutual fund in the given period. However, if we 
assume that weights that reflect the fund’s short-term and long-term behavior are good 
estimates of a fund’s actual and policy weights respectively, we can use RBSA to estimate the 
actual and policy weights. We assume this, and the rest of the analysis is in this chapter is 
based on this assumption.  
 
Let us now define a mutual fund’s actual style-weights as exposures in particular classes of 
investments that mimic the fund’s behavior in the short-run. Moreover, we define policy style-
weight as exposures in particular classes of investments that mimic a mutual fund’s behavior 
in the long-run. We let the actual style-weights and the policy style-weights to be our 
estimates of the fund’s actual weights and policy weights respectively.   
 
As previously mentioned, BHB argue that the 10-year mean average actual weight of each 
asset class is sufficient to approximate the policy weights. They argue that the reason for why 
this is a good approximation is that 10 years covers several business cycles, and that the 
average standard deviation of asset class holdings for common stocks and bonds is not high 
relative to the average amount held. Equivalently, one can argue that running RBSA with 10 
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years with return-data        months) is sufficient to estimate a fund’s policy weights. 
Based on this, we denote the fund’s policy style-weights as follows: 
   
  = Mutual fund m’s policy style-weight for asset class i in period T. This is found 
using RBSA for                    .  
Recall that equation (2) and (3) enable us to calculate a fund’s security selection and market 
timing as long as we have the actual and policy weights. If one accepts that the policy style-
weights are used as estimates of the fund’s policy weights, we can insert the policy style-
weight in formula (2) to model the return of mutual fund m at time T as follows:  
(17)          
       
 
                
Since we use RBSA as a mean of estimating the policy weights, we know that      
    
for i=1…n, and     
  
      (cf. problem (10), pg. 30). 
 
The terms in the bracket in formula (17) are defined as the style-benchmark. This is our 
estimate of Quadrant I in the generalized BHB-framework. The left hand side is Quadrant IV. 
The difference between the mutual fund’s return and style-benchmark is our estimate of the 
fund’s excess return, which consists of security selection and market timing. Sharpe (1992) 
argues that an adequate benchmark should ideally be I) a viable alternative, II) not easily 
beaten, III) low in cost and IV) identifiable before the fact. In section 1.3, we found 10 indices 
that compromise the benchmark for Norwegian mutual funds. A style-benchmark that consists 
of these indices seems to be a viable alternative. Furthermore, by using RBSA, we get a style-
benchmark that is not easily beaten, due to the fact that the asset class portfolio series closely 
follows the movement of the mutual fund for each t. Moreover, the style-benchmark is easy 
and cheap to replicate since it is comprised of 10 well-known indices. By using RBSA with 
return-series from period T-120 to T-1 instead of T-119 to T, we also ensure that the 
benchmark is identified in advance of time T. All in all, the style-benchmark seems like an 
adequate benchmark.  
 
Note that the use of RBSA implies that the policy style-weights are time-varying, something 
we know that policy-weights are not. Clearly, this is a weakness, but it should not pose a large 
problem: we will later see that the policy style-weights remain quite stable over time, simply 
because we use 10 years with return-data to find the weights.  
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Recall that we only need to quantify Quadrant IV, II and I in order to measure the fund’s 
security selection and market timing. We have already got a measure of Quadrant IV (it is just 
the mutual fund’s return), and Quadrant I is estimated in formula (17). All that remains is to 
estimate Quadrant II.  
 
In the generalized BHB-framework, the return of Quadrant II in period T is calculated by 
multiplying each asset class’ actual weights (in period T) with their passive return (in period 
T), and then summing this across all the asset classes. As previously argued, we now replace 
the actual weights with the fund’s actual style-weights.  
 
Recall that the actual weights are the fund’s proportions placed in particular classes of 
investments in the beginning of the current period. Since we use RBSA as a mean of 
estimating these weights, it is important to note that RBSA requires at least 2 time-periods to 
estimate the actual weights.
23
 At first though, running RBSA with 2 months with return-data 
(   ) would seem like a good idea. This means that the model uses return-series from the 
period T-2 to T-1 to estimate the actual weights at time T.
24
 However, in subsection 1.4.7., we 
saw that decreasing the length of the return series means that the noise in the estimated style-
weights increases. Hence, using only 2 months with return-data to estimate the actual weights 
is probably a bad strategy. A good estimate balances between having small enough time-
series that capture the fund’s short term movements, but long enough time-series to avoid 
excessive noise. 
 
Sharpe argues that an adequate benchmark should not be easily beaten. This implies that the 
style-benchmark should minimize the difference between Quadrant IV and Quadrant I. With 
similar arguments, an adequate estimate of Quadrant II should minimize the difference 
between Quadrant IV and Quadrant II. Let us for now call the difference between Quadrant 
IV and Quadrant II in period T for the prediction error and denote it    . As we have already 
argued, the value of this is affected by the time length used in RBSA. Let us call the time 
length that on average minimizes the prediction error for  . Only when we set     in 
                                                          
23
 To calculate the unbiased sample variance, we need at least 2 periods with return-data. If we only use one 
period with data, the denominator of the unbiased sample variance will be zero 
24
 We want the weights to be identified in advance of time T. Hence, we run the model using data from the 
period T-2 to T-1 instead of the period T-1 to T 
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RBSA, the prediction error is an adequate estimate of the security selection. We denote the 
actual style-weights as follows: 
   
  = Mutual fund m’s actual style-weight for asset class i in period T. This is found 
using RBSA for                   
If the mutual fund utilizes market timing,   should be considerably smaller than 120 months 
in order to capture short-term movements, but longer than 2 months in order to avoid noise. 
For funds that avoid market timing, the actual style-weights should be equivalent to the policy 
style-weights. In these cases, the confidence-intervals of the style-weights will just decrease 
as we increase the time length of the return-series. This implies that on average, the prediction 
error should decrease as v increases. In the next subsection, we will describe a stepwise 
approach that can be used to find  . 
 
By replacing the actual weights with the actual style-weights in formula (3), we can measure 
the return of mutual fund m at time T as follows: 
(18)          
       
 
          
Since we use RBSA as a mean of estimating the actual weights, we know that      
    
for i=1…n, and     
  
    1. The terms in the brackets are our estimate of Quadrant II in the 
BHB-framework, and the difference between the mutual fund’s return (Quadrant IV) and 
Quadrant II is the estimated security selection.  
 
We now have two equations (equation 17 and 18), and two unknowns (security selection and 
market timing). This makes it easy to estimate a fund’s security selection and market timing 
in a given time period.  
1.5.2. Finding the Optimal Time Length for Describing a Mutual Fund’s Short-Term 
Movements 
In this section we will look at a stepwise method that allows us find the optimal time length 
for describing a mutual fund’s short-term movements. As before, we denote the optimal time 
length  . We suggest the following stepwise approach:  
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1) Set   equal to some small number   
2) For the out-of-sample period          (  for future, where     ) proceed as 
follows:  
a. Find the style-weights in period   by running RBSA with return-data from time 
    until     
b. Use the style-weights in period   together with the return of the passive return-
series in period i to calculate the return of Quadrant II in period i  
c. Measure the prediction error (i.e., Quadrant IV – Quadrant II) in time period i. 
We denote this prediction error as        
3) Evaluate the performance of v from period T to F using a performance evaluation such 
as e.g., the mean square prediction error:     
        
  
   
     
 (Enders, 2010) 
4) Increase the value of  , and repeat steps 1-3. Proceed with this until       
 
The time length   that minimizes the MSPE would be the optimal time length for describing a 
mutual fund’s short-term movements, i.e.,  . In the next section we will look at a practical 
example where this method is used.  
 
1.5.3. Section Summary 
In this section we have assumed that weights that reflect the fund’s short-term and long-term 
behavior are good estimates of a fund’s actual and policy weights respectively. This implies 
that we can estimate the fund’s actual and policy weights using RBSA in two steps. These 
estimates can in turn be used in the generalized BHB-framework to estimate a fund’s security 
selection and market timing.  
 
In the next section, we will illustrate the framework using Norwegian mutual fund data. 
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1.6. Estimating Determinants of Risk and Managerial Performance using 
Norwegian Mutual-Fund Data 
In this section we will illustrate how the two-step approach can be used to estimate a mutual 
fund’s actual weights and policy weights using the passive return-series of the 10 predefined 
asset classes (cf. Table 5, pg. 21). Furthermore, we will illustrate how we can use these 
estimated weights to estimate security selection and market timing. All illustrations are done 
using Norwegian mutual-fund data.  
1.6.1. Mutual Fund Data 
We will look at current, active Norwegian mutual funds that focus on Norwegian equity, and 
that only have long positions. In order to estimate the funds’ asset allocation by RBSA, we 
need close to 10 years with return-data. Based on all these prerequisites, we can analyze 46 
mutual funds. A list of these mutual funds is given in Appendix D. Using a unit-root test; we 
find that all these mutual funds have stationary return-series (see appendix E).  
 
We use a fund’s net asset value (NAV) to compute mutual-fund returns. NAV is the fund 
price excluding redemption fees and sales charges. It is gross taxes, and net of management 
fees and costs. Furthermore, it assumes that dividends are reinvested in the fund. We calculate 
the return from period T-1 to T as follows:  
        
    
      
   
The time-series are collected via Børsprosjektet NHH and Bloomberg.
25
  
1.6.2. Finding   for Norwegian Mutual Funds 
In this section we will illustrate how we can use the stepwise-approach in section 1.5.2. to 
estimate the optimal time length for describing a mutual fund’s short-term movements. We let 
the out-of-sample period be January 31
st
 2007 (i.e., T) to December 31
st
 2010 (i.e., F). Hence, 
we have 48 out-of-sample observations for each mutual fund and for each value of v (length 
of return-series in RBSA). We vary v from 3 to 120. The time length that minimizes the 
MSPE in the period from T to F will be the optimal time length for describing a mutual fund’s 
short-term movements, and will be denoted Q. 
                                                          
25
 Courtesy of  Petter Slyngstadli in Holberg Forvalting 
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Let us first look at a mutual fund that seems like it utilizes market timing; namely DnB Nor 
Norge (I). We let the y-axis represent the MSPE, and the x-axis show the variation in v.  
FIGURE 2: 
MSPE for varying v for DnB Nor Norge (I) 
 
In this case, the short-term style-weights are able to predict better than the long-term style-
weights. More specifically, the style-weights in the region v = 12-30 months have the lowest 
MSPE. If the mutual fund does market timing, it is natural to infer that the short-term style-
weights have a smaller prediction error than the long-term style-weights on average. 
Therefore it seems like DnB Nor Norge (I) tries to time the market. Let us look at a mutual 
fund that does not seem to utilize market timing, namely Alfred Berg Gambak: 
FIGURE 3: 
MSPE for varying v for Alfred Berg Gambak 
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In this case, the MSPE decreases as v increases, and the short-term style-weights do not 
predict better than long-term style-weights. Recall that for funds that avoid market timing, the 
prediction error should on average decrease as v increases. This seems to be the case for 
Alfred Berg Gambak; hence, it seems like it tries to avoid market timing.  
 
Let us now generalize our framework, and use the stepwise-approach to estimate what   is on 
average for Norwegian mutual funds. We analyze each of the 46 mutual funds in Appendix D. 
As in the above examples, we use the out-of-sample period from January 31
st
 2007 (i.e., T) to 
December 31
st
 2010 (i.e., F). In order to find the optimal time length for describing 
Norwegian mutual fund’s short-term movement, where we vary v from 3 to 120,26 and rank 
each time length based on the mean, median and mode MSPE.
27
 Table 8 shows the result of 
the analysis:  
TABLE 8: 
Ranking of v for 46 Norwegian Mutual Funds 
Using Out-of-sample Period from 2007 to 2010 
 
 
                                                          
26
 Note that we were not able to find the MSPE up to v = 120 for all mutual funds, due to the fact that a few of 
these funds do not have long enough history. This might have affected the mode somewhat, although the effect is 
probably not large, since very few mutual funds have the lowest MSPE as v approaches 120 
27
 The mean refers to the following procedure: for each mutual fund, we rank each v based on MSPE (where the 
lowest MSPE is the best). Thereafter we rank each v based on the average ranking. The Median refers to the 
same procedure, but where we use median instead of mean. The mode refers to the following procedure: for each 
mutual fund, we rank each v based on MSPE. Thereafter we count how many times each v has the best ranking 
across the 46 mutual funds. The v with the highest count gets the best ranking 
Month Mean Median Mode
3 15 15 12
6 14 14 12
12 13 13 8
15 12 12 5
24 3 2 1
30 1 1 2
40 2 3 3
50 6 4 6
60 7 8 4
70 8 11 12
80 10 10 8
90 11 9 8
100 9 7 12
110 4 5 8
120 5 6 6
Ranking of Q r 46 Norwegian m tual funds
using out-of-sample perio    to 2010
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From this analysis, we see that v = 30 months has the smallest mean and median MSPE. On 
the other hand, v = 24 yield the best result when we count which v appears most frequently 
with the lowest MSPE. The list with the 46 mutual funds consists of funds that avoid market 
timing, and funds that utilize market timing. Hence, it is natural to assume that the mean and 
median in Table 8 are slightly higher than they would have been if we had taken out all the 
funds that avoid timing. Hence, we suggest setting   = 24 months to estimate Norwegian 
mutual funds’ actual style-weights.  
 
Unfortunately, Sharpe’s paper does not consider market timing at all. In fact, when Sharpe 
describes RBSA, he uses 60 months of return-data, and defines the difference between the 
mutual fund’s return in month T and that of the asset class portfolio series as security 
selection. In this section we have seen that this can only be true as long the mutual fund 
avoids market timing, or alternatively if   is 60 months. Table 8 seems to give little evidence 
to support such claims.  
 
The problem with using 60 months in RBSA is that the style-weights from such an analysis 
are not best able to reflect the mutual fund’s short-term movements. I.e., it is not best able to 
explain the fund’s short-term risk.  Therefore such weights should not be used by investors as 
a decision basis.  
 
If 60 months is used in RBSA, and   for U.S. funds is less than 60 months, the difference 
between the mutual fund’s return in month T and that of the asset class portfolio series will 
not only be security selection; it will also partly consist of market timing. Sharp finds that 
U.S. mutual funds on average have negative security selection. As we will see in the next 
chapter, Norwegian mutual funds loose on average by timing the market. If this is also the 
case in the U.S. market, Sharp’s framework underestimates the funds’ abilities to pick stocks.  
1.6.3. Estimating a Mutual Fund’s Determinants Risk 
The actual style-weights and policy style-weights constitute our estimates of a fund’s 
determinants of short-term and long-term risk respectively. In this subsection we will 
exemplify how the framework can be used to analyze a mutual fund’s short-term and long-
term risk over time. 
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Let us analyze a mutual fund which we are familiar with; namely DnB Nor Norge (I). We will 
investigate the fund’s policy style-weights from January 2006 to January 2011. In this matter, 
we use RBSA with 120 months of return-data to estimate the fund’s style-weights in January 
31
st
 2006, i.e., return-data from January 31
st
 1996 to December 31
st
 2005. The same analysis 
is run until we get the fund’s policy style-weight in January 31st 2011 (which we get by using 
RBSA with data from January 31
st
 2001 to December 31
th
 2010). This dynamic analysis is 
often referred to as a rolling style composition. Figure 4 show’s DnB Nor Norge (I)’s 
estimated policy style-weights in this period. This figure is often referred to as a rolling 
window:
28
 
FIGURE 4: 
120 Months Rolling Style Composition Showing Policy Style-Weights over Time.  
Period: Jan. 2006 – Jan. 2011. Mutual Fund: DnB Nor Norge (I)29 
  
Previously we mentioned that the use of RBSA implies that the policy style-weights are time-
varying, something we know that policy-weights are not. Figure 4 shows that this does not 
seem to be a large problem, due to the stability of the style-weights over time. This indicates 
that the policy style-weights are suitable estimates for the fund’s asset allocation. The figure 
shows that DnB Nor Norge (I) behave as if they have had an asset allocation focusing on 
large-caps value stocks (approximately 30%), small-caps stocks (approximately 40%), and the 
                                                          
28
 Note that the style-weights are calculated using discrete returns, and not log-returns. This would imply that we 
should minimize the geometric variance in RBSA. However, for simplicity we minimize the arithmetic variance. 
Such differences are nevertheless negligible 
29
 We have abbreviated the names of the asset classes in this figure (and all the subsequent ones using similar 
portrayals) as follows: S = small-caps, MG = mid-caps growth, MV = mid-caps value, LG = large-caps growth, 
LV = large-caps value, W = world, ex. Europe, E = Europe, ex. Norway, 3M = cash-equivalents with less than 3 
months to maturity, 3 Y = intermediate-term government bonds, 10 Y = long-term government bonds 
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remaining on mid-caps growth stocks, mid-caps value stocks and European stocks. The fact 
that the analysis shows that the fund behaves as if it invest up to 10% in European stocks is in 
line with their prospectus, which states that the fund may invest up to 20% in foreign 
companies not listed or traded on a Norwegian market. Note that every point in the figure 
represents the results of RBSA using a different set of 120 monthly returns.
 30
 In general, 
every set has v-2 months in common with its predecessor (here: 118 months in common). The 
point at the far right of the diagram represents the style described when the 120 months 
ending in December 2010 are analyzed; i.e., the fund’s policy style-weights in January 2011. 
This corresponds to the styles we saw in the column entitled “Quadratic Programming” in 
table 7.  
 
Previously we mentioned that most mutual funds use the Oslo Børs Mutual Fund Index 
(OSEFX) as their benchmark. This can be problematic if it does not reflect the true long-term 
risk of the fund. Let us therefore estimate OSEFX’s policy style-weights on January 31st 2011 
to proxy OSEFX’s long-term risk: 
FIGURE 5: 
Policy Style-Weights for OSEFX on Jan. 2011. 
(Based on Returns from Jan. 2000 – Dec. 2010) 
 
Amount of Variation in Return  
Explained by the Asset Classes. 
(Based on Returns from Jan. 2000 – Dec. 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using this as a proxy for long-term risk, we see that OSEFX behaves as if it is exposed to 
long-term risk from small-caps ( 42%), mid-caps growth stocks ( 12%), mid-caps value 
stocks ( 15%), large-caps growth stocks ( 6%), large-caps value stocks ( 23%) and 
                                                          
30
 Every point on the figure’s vertical axis represents one month. The associated style-weights in this month are 
represented by the different colors on the vertical axis at that point 
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European stocks ( 2%).31 These weights explain 94% of the OSEFX’s variation in return 
from 2000 – 2010. In table 7, we found DnB Nor Norge (I)’s policy style-weights for January 
2011. If we use this as a proxy for the fund’s long-term risk, we see that the fund behaves as if 
it has an asset allocation consisting of small-caps ( 38%), mid-caps growth stocks (6%), mid-
caps value stocks ( 13%), large-caps growth stocks ( 3%), large-caps value stocks ( 34%) 
and European stocks ( 5%). If we were to use OSEFX as a benchmark to DnB Nor Norge (I), 
we would not be able to reflect the fund’s true long-term risk. For instance, DnB Nor Norge 
(I) behaves as if it is exposed to more large-caps value stocks than OSEFX, whereas OSEFX 
is seemingly exposed to more of the risk from mid-caps growth stocks than DnB Nor Norge 
(I). In Table 4, we saw that the average risk and return across the 5 equity styles vary 
considerably. This implies that the only appropriate benchmark is a risk-adjusted benchmark 
that is that is able to mimic the mutual fund’s long-term investment policy. This is exactly 
why we use RBSA to find the fund’s policy style-weights. 
 
Let us now look at DnB Nor Norge (I)’s short-term risk from January 2006 to January 2011. 
In this matter, we use 24 months with return-data, implying that we have to use RBSA with 
return-data from January 31
st
 2004 to December 31
st
 2005 in order to estimate the fund’s 
actual weights in January 31
st
 2006. Figure 6 shows the estimated actual weights of DnB Nor 
Norge (I) from January 2006 to January 2011 using a rolling style-decomposition: 
FIGURE 6: 
24 Months Rolling Style Composition Showing Actual Style-Weights over Time.  
Period: Jan. 2006 – Jan. 2011. Mutual Fund: DnB Nor Norge (I) 
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 The fact that OSEFX is exposed to the European equity market is natural, as a large amount of the companies 
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The figure shows that the actual style-weights deviate from the policy style-weights (cf. figure 
4, pg. 47) over time. Such deviations point in the direction that DnB Nor Norge (I) utilizes 
market times. Furthermore, figure 6 indicates that the fund acts as if it utilizes bonds and bills 
in the short run. This is in line with the fund’s prospectus.  
 
In the next subsection, we will see how we can use the actual and policy style-weights to 
decompose the fund’s excess return. Before this is done, let us switch to another mutual fund 
we have looked upon earlier; namely Alfred Berg Gambak. Figure 7 shows the policy style-
weights of Alfred Berg Gambak from January 2006 to January 2011: 
FIGURE 7: 
120 Months Rolling Style Composition Showing Policy Style-Weights over Time.  
Period: Jan. 2006 – Jan. 2011. Mutual Fund: Alfred Berg Gambak 
 
The figure is relatively stable over time, indicating that the policy style-weights are suitable 
estimates for the fund’s asset allocation. The figure shows that Alfred Berg Gambak acts as if 
it has an asset allocation focusing on Norwegian small-caps stocks (approximately 60%), with 
the remaining assets evenly spread among mid-caps growth stocks, large-caps growth stocks, 
and large-caps value stocks. Using the weights in Figure 5 as a proxy for OSEFX’s long-term 
risk, we see that Alfred Berg Gambak behaves as if it is exposed to more small-caps stocks, 
and less large-caps value stocks in the long-run. This indicates that OSEFX is not suitable as a 
benchmark for Alfred Berg Gambak, because OSEFX would is not able to mimic the fund’s 
long-term investment policy. Let us look at Alfred Berg Gambak’s short-term risk from 
January 2006 to January 2011, as illustrated by Figure 8:  
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FIGURE 8: 
24 Months Rolling Style Composition Showing Actual Style-Weights over Time.  
Period: Jan. 2006 – Jan. 2011. Mutual Fund: Alfred Berg Gambak  
 
Previously we argued that it seemed like the fund did not utilize market timing because the 
MSPE just decreased as the time length in the return-data increased. This would imply that 
the actual style-weights are equivalent to the policy style-weights. However, by comparing 
Figure 8 with Figure 7, we see that this does not seem to be the case. This could imply that the 
fund does indeed try to time the market, or it could simply imply that 24 months is not enough 
time to get rid of the noise in Alfred Berg Gambak’s return-data. 
1.6.4. Estimating a Mutual Fund’s Determinants of Managerial Performance 
Having obtained estimates of the monthly actual and policy weights, we can easily use 
formulas (17) and (18) to estimate a mutual fund’s security selection and market timing in a 
given month. This enables us to evaluate a manager’s historical track record. Until now we 
have not mentioned anything about the cost of benchmarking. Sharpe (1992) argues that an 
adequate benchmark should be low in cost. Except for the bills and bonds, the indices we 
have used are not tradable, meaning that we will have to make a well educated guess of what 
it would cost to replicate them. In a paper from 2000, Ibbotson and Kaplan use RBSA to 
estimate the policy weights of mutual funds. In this matter, they assume that the cost of the 
benchmark is 2 basis points a month, which yields a cost of approximately 25 bps annually. 
This seems to be a reasonable level, and is also assumed in this analysis.  
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Fig. 9 shows the graphical development of DnB Norge (I)’s cumulative excess return, security 
selection and market timing from Jan. 2006 to Dec. 2010.
32
 The figures are net the cost of the 
style-benchmark. We also include the fund’s cumulative return in excess of OSEFX. 
FIGURE 9:
 
 
Cumulative Excess Return, Security Selection and Market Timing  
and the Fund’s Return in Excess of OSEFX.  
Fund: DnB Nor Norge (I). Period: Jan. 2006 - Dec. 2010 
 
Descriptive statistics using monthly returns 
Fund: DnB Nor Norge (I). Period: Jan. 2006 - Dec. 2010 
 
 
On average, DnB Nor Norge (I) outperformed the style-benchmark by 6 basis points per 
month, which amounts to approximately 0.72% per annum. The t-statistic associated with the 
mean is however, not statistically significantly different from zero at any reasonable level. 
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 No compounding is done in Figure 9 (and the subsequent ones using similar portrayals). This makes it possible 
to compare vertical distances directly at any point in the figure. The average values in Figure 9 are calculated 
using geometric averages. More specifically, the geometric mean,   =         
 
    
     , where    = return 
under study, and n = length of time-series. Geometric standard deviation,   = exp  
                     
  
   
 
  
 . Here: n = 60 
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Average (monthly) 0,06 % 0,40 % -0,34 % 0,12 %
StdDev 1,81 % 1,20 % 1,54 % 1,22 %
t-statistic 0,25 2,57 * -1,72 0,75
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 % level
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Furthermore, we see that DnB Nor Norge (I) possess skills (or luck) within security selection 
(average is positive and statistically different from 0), but loses by trying to time the market 
(although not significantly different from 0).  
 
Previously we argued that OSEFX is not a suitable benchmark for DnB Nor Norge (I), since 
OSEFX is not able to mimic the fund’s long-term investment policy. Figure 9 shows that 
OSEFX has a smaller long-term risk than the fund, since the benchmark overestimates the 
fund’s performance compared to our risk-adjusted performance measurement. Thus, if 
OSEFX were used as a benchmark for DnB Nor Norge (I),
33
 the managers would just need to 
cease using market timing and security selection in order to “beat the benchmark”. Clearly, 
this would give a wrong impression of the manager’s historic track record, since the return in 
excess of the OSEFX would just be the compensation for extra risk in the mutual fund. This is 
not something investors should pay management fees for.   
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 DnB Nor Norge (I) use the Linked OSEBX as their benchmark  
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Let us now look at Alfred Berg Gambak’s performance the last 5 years: 
FIGURE 10: 
Cumulative Excess Return, Security Selection and Market Timing  
and the Fund’s Return in Excess of OSEFX.  
Fund: Alfred Berg Gambak. Period: Jan. 2006 - Dec. 2010 
 
Descriptive statistics using monthly returns 
Fund: Alfred Berg Gambak. Period: Jan. 2006 - Dec. 2010  
 
Previously, we have not been able to conclude whether Alfred Berg Gambak utilizes market 
timing. Figure 10 shows that the average market timing is only -0.11% per month from 2006 
to 2010, and is not significantly different from 0%. Moreover, the fund has positive average 
excess return and security selection, but none of these are significantly different from 0%. 
 
Just as for DnB Nor Norge (I), we argued that OSEFX is not suitable as a benchmark for 
Alfred Berg Gambak. However, unlike the case with DnB Nor Norge (I), we see that OSEFX 
as a benchmark underestimates Alfred Berg Gambak’s performance compared to our risk-
adjusted performance measurement. Therefore it should be in the fund’s interest not to use 
OSEFX as a benchmark, since the long-term risk is seemingly less than that of OSEFX. 
Interestingly, the fund uses OSEFX as their benchmark (Alfred Berg Fondsforvalting).  
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** Significant at a 1 % level
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55 
 
Let us look at another example that shows the how well the model captures changes. On 
December 1
st
 2007, the fund Delphi Norge got a new portfolio manager. Figure 11 shows how 
this affected the managerial performance: 
FIGURE 11: 
Cumulative Excess Return, Security Selection and Market Timing  
and the Fund’s Return in Excess of OSEFX.  
Fund: Delphi Norge. Period: Jan. 2006 - Dec. 2010 
 
The figure shows that the fund’s managerial performance shifts during January 2008. The 
new manager seems to be good at timing at market, but not so good at picking stocks.
34
 
Hence, our model seems to be good at capturing mutual fund events. In Chapter 2, we will use 
this framework to see whether a change in a fund’s management causes a change in excess 
return, security selection or market timing.  
 
Our framework is based on the passive return-series of 10 predefined asset classes (cf. Table 
5, pg. 21). As a test of whether these indices are suitable, it would be interesting to look at the 
cumulative performance of OSEFX. If we have picked suitable indices, the average sum of 
market timing and security selection should be close to 0% per month.  Of course, it does not 
make sense to look at market timing and security selection in an index; therefore we are only 
interested in the excess return. Figure 12 shows the cumulative performance of OSEFX over 
the years 2006 to 2010: 
 
                                                          
34
 The average monthly security selection and market timing after January 2008 are significantly different from 
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FIGURE 12: 
Cumulative Excess Return 
 Using RBSA on OSEFX.  
Period: Jan. 2006 - Dec. 2010 
 
Descriptive statistics using monthly returns: 
 
 
Ideally the average excess return should be close to 0%. In this case we see that it is 
approximately -0.2% per month, although not significantly different from 0. Interestingly, it 
seems like the indices do not work too well during the financial crisis. When we add the fact 
that    
      (on January 31st 2011, cf. Figure 5, pg. 48), we conclude that the 10 indices 
are suitable. 
1.6.5. Section Summary  
In this section, we have illustrated how we can use the actual style-weights and the policy 
style-weights to estimate a mutual fund’s excess return. Furthermore, we have split this into 
security selection and market timing, and seen how their cumulative returns evolve over time. 
As these examples show, a remarkable amount of information can be revealed from an 
analysis of the returns provided by the mutual fund.  
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1.7. Weaknesses in Framework and Future Research 
One of the weaknesses with this framework is that the estimated policy weights change over 
time, despite policy weights are constant. We argue that since the policy style-weights do not 
change much over time, this should not pose a large problem. Nevertheless, this shows the 
problems with balancing between practical models and having models which are true to 
theory.  
 
Several of the indices used in this framework have weaknesses such as e.g., high correlation 
and being non-tradable. An investor with more experience in the financial market is likely to 
find more appropriate indices.  
 
Throughout this chapter, we have used monthly return-data. Sharpe (1995) argues that the use 
of monthly data is best because that is what is most readily available. Moreover, he argues, 
the problem with using daily returns is that one will get more noise in the data. For future 
research, it would be interesting to see whether weekly return-data are better in capturing the 
fund’s short-term movements. 
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1.8. Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a framework that can easily be used by investors 
to estimate a mutual fund’s actual weights and policy weights in a set of asset classes, and to 
estimate a mutual fund’s security selection and market timing.  
 
We start the chapter by generalizing Brinson, Hood and Beebower’s framework (BHB, 1986). 
Doing so, we see that we can measure a mutual fund’s security selection and market timing 
only if we have the fund’s actual and policy weights. Unless we are lucky to get these weights 
directly from the fund, we suggest that the weights can be estimated by Return Based Style 
Analysis (Sharpe, 1992).  
 
In RBSA, the weights no longer represent a fund’s historical proportions in a set of asset 
classes, but weights that reflect the behavior of the fund. We assume that weights that reflect 
the fund’s short-term and long-term behavior are good estimates of a fund’s actual and policy 
weights respectively. In order to estimate a fund’s policy weights, we suggest using RBSA 
with 120 months of return-data. To estimate a fund’s actual weights, we argue that we need to 
balance between having small enough time-series to capture the fund’s short term movements, 
but long enough time-series to avoid excessive noise.  
 
The framework illustrates that the length of the return-series has an effect on the interpretation 
of the style-weights, which in turn affects the interpretation of what the difference between a 
fund’s return and the asset class portfolio series is. Sharpe uses 60 months with return-data to 
estimate a fund’s actual weights. We warn against this, and suggest using the stepwise 
approach as described in subsection 1.5.2. to find the optimal length of the return-series. In 
this matter, we find that 24 months with return-data is enough to estimate an average 
Norwegian mutual fund’s actual weights. Once we have estimated the actual and policy 
weights, we can use them in the generalized BHB-framework to estimate a mutual fund’s 
security selection and market timing. To my knowledge, this chapter is the first formalization 
of the links between the papers of BHB and Sharpe. 
 
The return associated to the asset allocation is the investor’s responsibility and not the 
manager’s, since the investor chooses to bet on that particular risk. In this matter it is essential 
for investors to have an overview of the fund’s determinants of risk. Our framework gives an 
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investor the possibility to access a mutual fund’s short- and long-term risk; making it easier 
for them to choose mutual funds that suit their risk-preference.  
 
If we do not have a benchmark that accounts for a fund’s true long-term risk, we might up end 
up paying too much in management fees, because we falsely believe that the return which is 
created in excess of the benchmark is security selection and/or market timing, while in reality 
it is just the payoff from extra risk in the mutual fund. Our framework accounts for the fund’s 
long-term risk, enabling investors to easily get an overview of the fund’s managerial 
performance.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
An Empirical Study of Norwegian Mutual Fund 
Managers  
 
– Using the Two-Step Return Based Style Analysis 
 
2.1. Introduction 
his chapter builds on the framework that is developed in chapter 1, and the two 
chapters must therefore be read in a sequential order. We use the framework to study 
three important questions related to Norwegian mutual fund managers:  
1) How much of the total variation in mutual fund return is explained by asset allocation, 
security selection and market timing respectively? 
2) Is the average managerial performance positive? 
3) Ceteris paribus, does a change in a mutual fund’s management cause a change in 
managerial performance? 
 
Before we start the analysis, we will have a closer look at the objective of each problem 
statement and present some previous studies that have addressed the same questions before.  
2.1.1. Problem Statement 1:  
The objective of problem statement 1 is to analyze the relative importance of asset allocation, 
security selection and market timing on a mutual fund’s variability over time. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the return associated to the asset allocation is the investor’s responsibility and not 
the manager’s, since the investor chooses to bet on that particular risk. On the other hand, the 
manager is responsible for security selection and market timing. This implies that variability 
of asset allocation is the investor’s responsibility, whereas the variability in security selection 
and market timing is the manager’s responsibility. In this matter, our results will shed light on 
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whether it is the manager or the investor that are responsible for most of the fund’s variability 
and return over time.  
 
No studies have used Norwegian mutual fund data to study similar problems. However, 
numerous studies have used U.S. data to study the question. Brinson, Hood and Beebower’s 
(hereafter BHB) paper “Determinants of Portfolio Performance” (1986) is the first study of 
this kind. Using the framework we described in Chapter 1 (cf. subsection 1.2.), BHB study the 
variability of each quadrant over time. Their analysis is based on return-data of 91 large U.S. 
pension plans from 1974 to 1983. Another well-known study is by Brinson, Singer and 
Beebower (hereafter BSB) in “Determinants of Portfolio Performance II: An Update” (1991). 
Their analysis is based on BHB’s framework, and uses return-data of 82 large U.S. pension 
plans from 1977 to 1987. Table 9 shows the results of the two analyses:  
TABLE 9: 
Average Percentage of Variation in Return Explained by Each Quadrant 
            BHB (1986)           BSB (1991)  
Selection 
Actual Passive 
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 (IV) 
Average: 100% 
(II) 
Average: 95.3% 
P
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e (III) 
Average: 97.8% 
(I) 
Average: 93.6% 
Selection 
Actual Passive 
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 (IV) 
Average: 100% 
(II) 
Average: 93.3% 
P
as
si
v
e (III) 
Average: 96.1% 
(I) 
Average: 91.5% 
 
The studies show that asset allocation (i.e., Quadrant I) accounts for most of a fund’s variation 
in return over time, whereas security selection and market timing in sum account for less than 
10% of the fund’s variation in return over time. This means that the investors have the largest 
responsibility for a fund’s variability over time, not the manager. The subsequent implication 
of this is that the investor has the largest responsibility for the fund’s return, since it is the 
investor who chooses to bet on the risk that follows with the fund’s asset allocation.  
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2.1.2. Problem Statement 2 
A fund’s managerial performance is determined by security selection and market timing; 
which in sum constitute the fund’s excess return. By studying the average excess return in 
Norway, we will find out whether active management has been valuable for Norwegian 
investors. By studying the average security selection, we will be able to say something about 
the efficiency of the Norwegian equity market. Moreover, by studying the average market 
timing in Norway, we might also be able to tell whether the assumptions of Mossin (1968), 
Merton (1969, 1971) and Samuelson (1969) are too strict (cf. main introduction). 
 
Problem statement 2 has been subject to an abundant amount of studies using U.S. data. 
However, Norwegian mutual fund managers and their performance have been subject to very 
little research. One early paper is by Gjerde and Sættem (1991). They find that Norwegian 
mutual fund managers possess market timing abilities, but have less ability to pick stocks. 
Overall, they find that the mutual funds outperform the market during 1982 – 1984, but 
underperform from 1984-1990. Then there is a gap in the Norwegian research until Sørensen 
(2009). He uses the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) 
and Mossin (1966) with OSEFX as a benchmark, the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model 
and the Fama-French-Carhart (1997) four-factor model
35
 on a dataset from 1982 to 2008 
without survivorship-bias. Doing so, he finds little evidence of abnormal return.  
 
The RBSA-methodology has never been used to investigate the managerial performance of 
Norwegian mutual funds. Unlike the factor-models which are mentioned above, the two-step 
RBSA acknowledges OSEFX may not be the best way of capturing a fund’s long-term risk. 
Moreover, the two-step RBSA is not a static model that says that small-caps is always better 
than growth-stock, or that value stocks is always better than growth stocks. However, the 
framework acknowledges that there are monthly differences in the 10 indices.   
2.1.3. Problem Statement 3 
The market has a tendency to penalize poorly performing funds via a systematic loss in 
market share to superior performers (Ippolito, 1992). In this matter, a mutual fund’s board and 
investment advisors have a strong interest in making sure that the mutual fund manager 
                                                          
35
 The four-factor model accounts the following 4 factors: market risk premium, SMB (the difference between 
small and large caps stocks), HML (the difference between value and growth stocks) and momentum 
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provides satisfactory results. In cases where the board and investment advisors are unsatisfied 
with the manager, a natural consequence is to dismiss the manager. By analyzing the 
consequences of fund manager replacement on a fund’s subsequent excess return, we will 
shed light on whether internal control mechanisms are effective in reversing the performance 
of poorly performing mutual funds. Understanding the post-replacement effects in a mutual 
fund setting is especially useful for the fund’s investors. There are two reasons for this: 1) it 
enables them to know whether the fund’s board and investment advisors engage in value-
enhancing activities and 2) it shows the effect of the consequences on the mutual fund’s 
return.  
 
Few international studies address problem statement 3. However, one exception is Khorana 
(1996 and 2001). Khorana (1996) studies the relationship between managerial replacement 
and pre-replacement performance. In this matter, he finds evidence supporting the presence of 
an inverse relationship between the probability of fund manager replacement and past 
performance.  
 
In a newer study, Khorana (2001) finds that the replacement of poorly performing managers 
leads to substantial improvements in post-replacement performance relative to the pre-
replacement performance. Moreover, he finds that the new fund managers continue to exhibit 
underperformance in the post-replacement period. This, Khorana’s results show that the 
internal market for corporate control in the mutual fund industry is effective in disciplining 
poorly performing fund managers. By hiring new managers, the fund’s board and investment 
advisors are able to reverse the fund’s performance to more normal levels. On the other hand, 
his data show that the samples of mutual funds that overperform in the pre-replacement period 
experience a significant deterioration in post-replacement performance. The new managers 
continue to overperform, but without significant superior performance. 
 
Khorana’s analysis is based on using the CAPM and the Fama-French-Carhart (1997) four-
factor model as frame of reference to measure abnormal return. No similar analysis has been 
made with RBSA before, and neither has it been done with Norwegian mutual fund data. 
Moreover, it would be interesting to analyze the consequences of the replacement on the 
fund’s subsequent return from security selection and market timing. This would enable us to 
see whether it is security selection or market timing that distinguishes a good manager from a 
poor manager. To my knowledge, this has not been analyzed before.  
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2.1.4. Disposal 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the methodology 
and datasets that are used for each problem statement. Section 2.3 provides a discussion of the 
empirical results. In section 2.4, we look at the studies’ weaknesses, whereas we conclude in 
section 2.5.  
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2.2. Methodology and Data 
All analysis related to our 3 problem statements are based on the framework developed in 
Chapter 1. In this matter, we use the same 10 asset classes as before: bills, government bonds 
(3 years and 10 years), Norwegian equities (small-caps, mid-caps growth, mid-caps value, 
large-caps growth and large-caps value), European equities (excluding Norwegian equities), 
and world equities (excluding European equities). For an overview of their associated passive-
return series, see Table 5 in Chapter 1. These time-series are collected via DataStream.   
 
All problem statements are related to current, active Norwegian mutual funds that focus on 
Norwegian equity. In order to use the framework in Chapter 1, we restrict ourselves to only 
look at mutual funds that have long positions in the asset classes. In Chapter 1, we argue that 
we need 10 years with return-data to estimate a fund’s policy weights. Based on all these 
prerequisites, we can potentially analyze 46 mutual funds. A list of these is given in Appendix 
D. Using a unit-root test; we find that all these mutual funds have stationary return-series (see 
appendix E). 
 
We use a fund’s net asset value (NAV) to compute mutual fund returns. NAV is the fund 
price excluding redemption fees, sales charges and front/back end load. It is gross taxes, and 
net of management fees and costs. Furthermore, it assumes that dividends are reinvested in 
the fund. We calculate the return from period T-1 to T as follows:  
        
    
      
   
The time-series are collected via Børsprosjektet NHH and Bloomberg.
36
  
 
In the following subsections, we will look more specifically into the methodology and 
datasets that are used in the analysis related to each problem statement.  
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 Courtesy of  Petter Slyngstadli in Holberg Forvalting 
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2.2.1. Methodology and Data in Problem Statement 1 
In Chapter 1, we find that we only need to quantify Quadrant IV, II and I to measure the 
return-effect of a mutual fund’s security selection and market timing. Similarly, we only need 
to measure the amount of variation that is explained by Quadrant IV, II and I in order to 
calculate how much of the total variation in mutual fund return that is explained by asset 
allocation, security selection and market timing. Recall from Chapter 1 that the efficacy of the 
asset classes can be measured by the portion of the variance of a mutual fund’s return that is 
explained by the predefined asset classes (same as equation 13): 
   
  
   
     
   
   
     
   
 
where   
  = sample variance of mutual fund m and    = sample variance of the tracking error 
(cf. problem (9), pg. 30).  
 
Quantifying the amount of variation that is explained by Quadrant IV is easy. By definition it 
is 100%. Quantifying the amount of variation that is explained by Quadrant II and I will 
require some more work. Recall that Quadrant II is measured by the fund’s actual weights and 
the passive return of the predefined asset classes, whereas Quadrant I is measured by the 
fund’s policy weights and the passive return of the predefined asset classes. By using RBSA 
with 24 months of return-data, we can use equation (13) to estimate how much of the total 
variation in a fund’s return that is explained by Quadrant II. Similarly, by using 120 months 
with return-data, we can use equation (13) to estimate how much of total variation in a fund’s 
return that is explained by equation Quadrant I.
37
 Once we have done this for each fund, we 
calculate the arithmetic average    
  for all mutual funds in Quadrant I and Quadrant II. This 
will in enable us to measure the average amount of variation that is explained by asset 
allocation, security selection and market timing for all funds. 
 
This analysis is based on the 46 mutual funds that are specified in Appendix D. To estimate 
their policy weights, we use monthly return-data from Jan. 31
st
 2001 to December 31
st
 2010. 
To estimate the actual weights, we use monthly return-data from Jan. 31
st
 2009 to December 
31
st
 2010.  
                                                          
37
 We use A. Steiner’s coding (available through the MATLAB central) to estimate the actual and policy 
weights. He uses a definition of    
  that is different from ours. Due to this, we have changed his coding so that 
we can measure it according to our definition in equation (13) 
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2.2.2. Methodology and Data in Problem Statement 2 
In order to investigate the average managerial performance of Norwegian mutual funds, we 
use the framework in chapter 1 to estimate each fund’s excess return, security selection and 
market timing in each month from 2006 to 2010. Figure 13 illustrates this:  
FIGURE 13: 
Methodology for calculating each fund’s managerial performance 
        
      24 months to   
      estimate actual  
      weight at  
      start of year 2006             
 
Year  1996            2006               2010 
 
            
          10 years to estimate                     5 years with monthly measurements  
              policy weights      of managerial performance 
           at start of year 2006      
 
For illustrational purposes, Figure 13 only shows that we estimate the actual and policy 
weights for January 31
st
 2006. However, as in Chapter 1 (subsection 1.6.3.), we use rolling 
style decomposition to estimate the actual and policy weights for each month in the period 
2006 to 2010, before we use these in formula (17) and (18) to estimate the fund’s managerial 
performance in each month over the same period.  
 
Once we have estimated each fund’s monthly excess return, security selection and market 
timing, we calculate the fund’s geometric average monthly excess return, security selection 
and market timing. When we have done this for each mutual fund under study, we proxy the 
average managerial performance of Norwegian mutual funds by calculating the arithmetic 
average monthly excess return, security selection and market timing for all funds. 
 
Since RBSA requires 10 years of return-data to estimate the funds’ policy weights, and we 
study the fund’s monthly managerial performance from 2006 to 2010, the analysis requires 
mutual funds with at least 15 years with return-data. Out of the 46 funds in appendix D, 22 
69 
 
mutual funds these fulfill this requirement. See appendix F for the list of which mutual funds 
are used for this analysis.  
2.2.3. Methodology and Data in Problem Statement 3 
From Khorana (1996), we know that the replacement of underperforming managers is likely 
to occur due to dismissal. The replacement of an average manager can be due to either 
voluntary replacement or dismissal. Moreover, managerial replacement of overperforming 
managers is likely to come voluntary. Even though voluntary departure and dismissal will be 
reflected in managerial turnover, the factors leading to replacement are different in the two 
cases. Unfortunately, the lack of any publicly available information makes us unable to 
distinguish explicitly among the various reasons for replacement (Khorana, 2001). As a proxy 
for the reason behind replacement, we do as Khorana and decompose the sample of mutual 
funds based on the pre-replacement performance.  
 
We measure the pre-replacement performance by the arithmetic average monthly excess 
return. We define managers that have negative arithmetic average monthly excess return in 
the pre-replacement period as underperformers, and define managers that have positive 
arithmetic average monthly excess return in the pre-replacement period as overperformers. In 
the absence of publicly available information on the rationale behind replacement, a 
decomposition like this serves as the second best alternative.  
 
This problem statement requires information on when the mutual funds changed management. 
The information of the month and the year of managerial replacement are obtained from 
Morningstar.
38
  
 
Our analysis is based on all Norwegian mutual funds that have 11 years with return-data pre-
replacement. We use the first 10 years to estimate the policy weights for the first month in the 
11
th
 year, and use the 11
th
 year to study the managerial performance of the old manager. We 
ensure that the new manager gets 3 years with return-data post-replacement. The 2 first years 
are used for estimating the new manager’s actual weights in the first month of the 13th year, 
whereas the last year is used to study the new manager’s managerial performance. Based on 
these prerequisites, we can analyze 14 current mutual funds. Out of these funds, 7 mutual 
                                                          
38
 Note that Morningstar only publishes the last change in mutual fund management  
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funds underperformed pre-replacement and 7 funds overperformed pre-replacement. See 
appendix G for a list of which mutual funds are analyzed, and when managerial replacement 
took place. Figure 14 illustrates this methodology.   
 
FIGURE 14: 
Methodology for Problem Statement 3: 
 
                      Change in manager 
        
 Old Manager, Pre-Replacement:  24 months to   
      estimate actual  
      weights at  
      start of year 10             
 
Year   0               10     11          13        14 
  
            
          10 years to estimate                   Measurement  
              policy weights    of managerial 
           at start of year 10   performance 
        of old manager 
        
 
 New Manager, Post-Replacement:                 10 years to estimate 
               policy weights  
               at start of year 13 
 
Year   0               10     11            13         14 
 
            
                       24 months to Measurement 
                      estimate actual           of managerial  
                   weights at   performance of 
         start of year 13 new manager 
 
                           Change in manager 
 
For illustrational purposes, Figure 14 only shows that we estimate the actual and policy 
weights at the start of year 10 for the old manager and at the start of year 13 for the new 
manager. However, as in Chapter 1 (subsection 1.6.3.), we use rolling style decomposition to 
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estimate the actual and policy weights for each month in the years 10 – 11 and 13 – 14. These 
weights are in turn used in equation (17) and (18) to measure each fund’s excess return, 
security selection and market timing in each month. Since our main interest is in whether the 
changes are significant, we chose not to include the cost of benchmarking when we calculate 
each fund’s managerial performance. Once the managerial performance has been calculated, 
we calculate each fund’s geometric average monthly excess return, security selection and 
market timing, both in the pre-replacement period (year 10-11) and the post-replacement 
period (year 13-14). When we have done this for each mutual fund under study, we proxy the 
average managerial performance pre-replacement for the underperformers and the 
overperformers by calculating the arithmetic average monthly excess return, security selection 
and market timing across the 7 overperformers and the 7 underperformers respectively. The 
same method is used to proxy the average managerial performance post-replacement across 
the respective 7 overperfomers and the 7 underperformers. We can compare the mean 
performance in the pre- and post-replacement periods using the following t-statistic:  
 
  
                 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
This is approximately t-distributed with   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
    
 
 
  
 
  
  
    
 degrees of freedom (Keller, 2005). 
where:  
      =  Average performance in either excess return, security selection  
or market timing, pre-replacement  
  
    =  Sample variance in either excess return, security selection  
or market timing, pre-replacement 
      =  Average performance in either excess return, security selection  
or market timing, post-replacement 
  
    =  Sample variance in either excess return, security selection  
or market timing, post-replacement 
      = Total number of mutual funds pre-replacement 
      = Total number of mutual funds post-replacement 
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In this case,        . Our null-hypothesis (for both underperformers and overperformers) 
is that that the respective average performance in excess return, security selection and market 
timing does not change after the managerial replacement. Hence,             .   
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2.3. Results and Analysis 
2.3.1. Problem Statement 1 
In this subsection we will look at the empirical results related to the question of how much of 
the total variation in mutual fund return is explained by asset allocation, security selection and 
market timing respectively. Table 10 shows the arithmetic average and median amount of 
total variation in mutual fund return that is explained by Quadrant IV, II and I: 
TABLE 10: 
Selection 
Actual Passive 
T
im
in
g
 A
ct
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al
 (IV) 
Average: 100% 
Median: 100% 
(II) 
Average: 95.1% 
Median: 97.3% 
P
as
si
v
e (III) 
N/A 
(I) 
Average: 90.6% 
Median: 92.2% 
 
The total amount of variation in mutual fund return that is explained by security selection is 
on average 4.9% (Quadrant IV – Quadrant II), whereas market timing explains 4.5% of the 
variation on average (Quadrant II – Quadrant I). The amount of variation in mutual fund 
return that is explained by asset allocation is on average 90.6%. Unlike BHB (1986) or BSB 
(1991), we do not have access to the funds’ actual weights. We have estimated the values by 
the two-step RBSA. In this matter, the similarity of our results to those of BHB and BSB 
confirm the reliability of the framework in chapter 1.  
 
Our results clearly show that it is the investor who has the largest responsibility for the fund’s 
variability in return; not the manger. The implication of this is that it is the investor who has 
the largest responsibility of the fund’s return over time, since they choose to bet on the risk 
that follows with the fund’s asset allocation. Of course, this is under the assumption that the 
investor is fully aware of the fund’s asset allocation and the subsequent long-term risk when 
they invest in the mutual fund. The average Norwegian mutual fund investor should therefore 
use more time on reviewing their fund’s asset allocation and less time on manager searches.  
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2.3.2. Problem Statement 2 
In this subsection we will look at the empirical results related to whether Norwegian mutual 
fund managers are to create positive managerial performance. Recall that managerial 
performance is the same as excess return, which we can split into security selection and 
market timing. Ignoring any costs associated with style-benchmarks, we get the descriptive 
statistics given by table 11: 
TABLE 11: 
Arithmetic average monthly excess return, security selection and market timing,  
and the associated standard deviation and t-statistic when cost of benchmarking is excluded.
39
 Period: 2006-2010 
 
For an overview of the geometric average monthly excess return, security selection and 
market timing for each fund under study, see Appendix H. The analysis shows that the 22 
current Norwegian mutual funds are good in picking stocks, but poor in timing the market. 
Both monthly security selection and monthly market timing are significant at 1% significance 
level. In sum, the mutual funds underperform the style-benchmark. However, the sum of 
security selection and market timing is close to zero, and not significantly different from 0%. 
This result is in accordance with Sørensen’s result.  
 
The above results are under the unlikely assumption that the benchmark has zero cost. Adding 
a cost of 2 basis points per month (cf. subsection 1.6.4.), we get the descriptive statistics given 
by Table 12: 
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 The t-statistics in this table (and subsequent ones using similar portrayals) is calculated as follows: 
    
 
  
, where 
   = sample mean of managerial performance (either excess return, security selection or market timing) and   = 
sample standard deviation of managerial performance. n = sample size. The critical value of a two-sided test is 
found using n – 1 degrees of freedom in the student t-distribution 
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
Average (monthly) -0.005 % 0.175 % -0.180 %
Stdev (monthly) 0.173 % 0.251 % 0.180 %
t-statistic -0.13 3.28 ** -4.70 **
** Significant at 1% level
*   Significant at 5% level
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TABLE 12: 
Arithmetic average monthly excess return, security selection and market timing,  
and the associated standard deviation and t-statistic when cost of benchmarking is included. Period: 2006-2010 
 
Now the average excess return is positive, and annualizes to approximately 18 basis points. 
However, the figure is still not significantly different from 0. Note that market timing is 
unaffected by the change. The reason for this is that the inclusion of the cost makes the fund’s 
return increase without changing the estimated actual or policy weights.  
 
The significance of the security selection seems to point in the direction that the mutual funds 
have either skills or information. The implication of this is that the Norwegian equity market 
cannot be efficient in the semi-strong form.  
 
If the mutual funds had stopped timing the market, the excess return would have increased to 
approximately 2.4% a year. Hence, the strategic under- or overweighting of an asset class 
relative to its policy weighs leads to worse results. This is in line with the theories by Mossin 
(1968), Merton (1969, 1971) and Samuelson (1969) (cf. part 1). However, it does not imply 
that MMS’s assumptions are correct.  
 
Only one of the 22 mutual funds under study manages to have positive market timing and 
security selection at the same time, even when accounting for the cost of the benchmark.
40
 
The fact that few funds have the ability to select undervalued securities and time the market at 
the same time is in line previous research. See e.g., Volkman (1999). 
2.3.3. Problem Statement 3 
In this subsection, we will look at the empirical results related to whether a change in a 
mutual fund’s management causes a change in managerial performance. The 7 
underperformers have the following descriptive statistics pre-replacement:  
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 This is Storebrand Vekst  
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
Average (monthly) 0.015 % 0.195 % -0.180 %
Stdev (monthly) 0.173 % 0.251 % 0.180 %
t-statistic 0.41 3.65 ** -4.70 **
** Significant at 1% level
*   Significant at 5% level
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TABLE 13: 
Arithmetic average monthly excess return, security selection and market timing, and  
the associated standard deviation and t-statistic for underperformers pre-replacement  
 
The fact that the underperformers have negative average excess return should not come as a 
surprise, cf. how we defined underperformers. However, we note that the excess return is not 
different from 0% at any reasonable significance level. We observe that underperformers are 
characterized by significant negative market timing, and insignificant security selection.  
 
The replacement of underperforming managers is likely to occur due to dismissal. In this 
matter, it is interesting to look at the funds’ performance in the post-replacement period:  
TABLE 14: 
Arithmetic average monthly excess return, security selection and market timing, and  
the associated standard deviation and t-statistic for underperformers post-replacement 
 
After the managerial replacement, the funds experience a dramatic increase in average excess 
return. Now the average excess return is positive and significant at 5% level, and amounts to 
above 6.7% per annum. We note that average market timing is not significantly different from 
0% anymore. The question is then: which changes are significant? We get the t-statistics in 
table 15: 
 
 
 
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
Average (monthly) -0.275 % 0.144 % -0.430 %
Stdev (monthly) 0.378 % 0.666 % 0.336 %
t-statistic -1.92 0.57 -3.39 *
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 % level
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
Average (monthly) 0.559 % 0.443 % 0.114 %
Stdev (monthly) 0.587 % 0.815 % 0.300 %
t-statistic 2.52 * 1.44 1.00
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 % level
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TABLE 15: 
Testing for differences in average monthly managerial performance before and  
after replacement of underperforming manager 
 
When the samples have negative average excess return in the pre-replacement period, we see 
that the managerial replacement significantly increases average excess return in the post-
replacement period. We mentioned that managerial replacement of underperforming 
managers is likely to be due to dismissal. If poor fund performance is attributable to 
managerial abilities rather than bad luck, and if the fund’s board and investment advisors are 
on average able to attract an average managerial talent, one would indeed anticipate the 
managerial change to cause an improvement in the average excess return. This implies that 
market for corporate control in the Norwegian mutual fund industry is effective in disciplining 
poorly performing fund managers.  
 
Khorana (2001) finds that when underperformers are replaced, the new managers continue to 
underperform in the post-replacement period. Our findings show that the new managers 
overperform in the post-replacement period. However, due to the low sample size of our 
analysis, we should be careful with interpreting the absolute numbers too much. We should 
rather have an emphasis on whether the changes and figures are significant or not. Here we 
find that the change is positive and significant; which is in line with theory. Moreover, we 
find that the change mainly comes because the new manager utilizes less market timing. 
Assuming that fund’s board and investment advisors are able to attract an average managerial 
talent, Table 14 implies that average managers avoid market timing, and do not possess stock-
picking skills.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
t-statistic 3.16 * 0.75 3.20 *
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 % level
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Let us look at the descriptive statistics of the managers that performed well in the pre-
replacement period: 
TABLE 16: 
Arithmetic average monthly excess return, security selection and market timing, and  
the associated standard deviation and t-statistic for overperformers pre-replacement 
 
 
We see that these managers are able to beat the style-benchmark with above 6.4% per annum. 
Most of this is due to significant security selection. Furthermore, we see that market timing is 
not significantly different from 0%. Hence, overperformers are characterized by stock-picking 
skills and avoidance of market timing. Recall that managerial replacement of overperforming 
managers is likely to come voluntary. It would be interesting to see what effect this has on the 
post-replacement performance:  
TABLE 17: 
Arithmetic average monthly excess return, security selection and market timing, and  
the associated standard deviation and t-statistic for overperformers post-replacement 
 
 
Now we see that security selection has decreased, but it is still significantly different from 0% 
at 5% level. We see that market timing has become negative, but it remains insignificant. In 
total, the excess return is still positive, but not significantly different from 0%. The question is 
then: are these changes significant? Table 18 tells the story: 
 
 
 
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
Average (monthly) 0.535 % 0.509 % 0.028 %
Stdev (monthly) 0.483 % 0.291 % 0.498 %
t-statistic 2.93 * 4.63 ** 0.15
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 %  level
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
Average (monthly) 0.214 % 0.397 % -0.191 %
Stdev (monthly) 0.351 % 0.312 % 0.280 %
t-statistic 1.61 3.37 * -1.81
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 %  level
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TABLE 18: 
Testing for differences in average monthly managerial performance before and  
after replacement of overperforming manager 
 
 
We see that the changes are not significant for any of the components. Recall that Khorana 
(2001) finds that the sample of overperforming funds in the pre-replacement period 
experience a significant deterioration in subsequent fund return. Based on this, it would be 
interesting to investigate whether we get a similar result if split the 7 overperformers into a 
group of 2 with low overperformers and high overperformers.
41
  
 
Table 19 shows the descriptive statistics of the low overperformers, pre- and post-
replacement.  
TABLE 19: 
Arithmetic average monthly excess return, security selection and market timing, and  
the associated standard deviation and t-statistic for low overperformers pre-replacement 
 
 
Arithmetic average monthly excess return, security selection and market timing, and  
the associated standard deviation and t-statistic for low overperformers post-replacement 
 
 
 
                                                          
41
 We look at the 4 best achievers and the 4 worst achievers (hence, one of the mutual funds ends up in both 
categories) 
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
t-statistic -1.42 -0.69 -1.02
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 %  level
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
Average (monthly) 0.170 % 0.447 % -0.280 %
Stdev (monthly) 0.182 % 0.308 % 0.428 %
t-statistic 1.86 2.91 -1.31
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 %  level
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
Average (monthly) 0.390 % 0.583 % -0.208 %
Stdev (monthly) 0.236 % 0.183 % 0.368 %
t-statistic 3.30 * 6.38 ** -1.13
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 %  level
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Table 20 shows whether the changes are significant:  
TABLE 20: 
Testing for differences in average monthly managerial performance before and  
after replacement of low overperforming manager 
 
The descriptive statistics suggest that the low overperformers pre-replacement are 
characterized by insignificant managerial performance. When these managers are replaced, 
we see no significant changes. One reason for this might be that low overperformers have a 
managerial performance which is quite close to the average performance of all mutual funds 
(cf. Table 11, pg. 74). This suggests that when these managers are replaced by a new average 
manager, we should not be able to see any significant changes.  
 
Let us look at the high overperformers. Table 21 shows the descriptive statistics of these 
funds pre- and post-replacement. 
TABLE 21: 
Arithmetic average monthly excess return, security selection and market timing, and  
the associated standard deviation and t-statistic for high overperformers pre-replacement 
 
 
Arithmetic average monthly excess return, security selection and market timing, and  
the associated standard deviation and t-statistic for high overperformers post-replacement 
 
 
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
t-statistic 1.96 1.01 0.34
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 %  level
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
Average (monthly) 0.870 % 0.545 % 0.329 %
Stdev (monthly) 0.333 % 0.267 % 0.255 %
t-statistic 5.23 * 4.08 * 2.58
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 %  level
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
Average (monthly) 0.147 % 0.238 % -0.091 %
Stdev (monthly) 0.457 % 0.292 % 0.208 %
t-statistic 0.65 1.63 -0.88
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 %  level
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Table 22 shows whether the changes are significant:  
TABLE 22: 
Testing for differences in average monthly managerial performance before and  
after replacement of high overperforming manager 
 
The descriptive statistics of the managers pre-replacement suggest that the overperformers are 
characterized by skills in security selection. When they are replaced, the excess return drops 
significantly at 5% level. This makes sense, as the very best managers are a scarce resource. If 
they are offered better positions elsewhere, one would expect it to be hard to find a 
replacement that is equally good. If the fund’s board and investment advisors are only able to 
attract an average managerial talent, one would expect a decrease in the fund’s performance 
towards the average performance of all funds. Hence, the results underline the importance of 
trying to keep such managers in the fund. These results are in line with Khorana (2001). 
 
The analysis shows that most of the decline in excess return comes from a decrease in the 
results in market timing. This could indicate that the very best performers are good in timing 
the market. However, Table 21 disproves this, since market timing pre-replacement is not 
significantly different from 0%. Therefore the significant change in market timing is more 
likely to come from the low sample size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Excess Return Security Selection Market Timing
t-statistic -3.38 * -2.05 -3.38 *
** Significant at a 1 % level
*   Significant at a 5 %  level
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2.4. Weaknesses of Study 
2.4.1. Sample Size 
Problem statement 1, 2 and 3 are based on a sample-size of 46, 22 and 14 mutual funds 
respectively. In problem statement 3, we have decomposed the 14 mutual funds into 2 groups 
with 7 under and overperformers. Moreover, we have split the overperformers into 2 more 
groups. Although much of our results are highly significant, it is evident that our sample size 
should have been larger. However, RBSA requires at least 10 years with return-data to 
estimate the policy weights. This makes it hard to get large datasets with Norwegian mutual 
funds. For future research, it would have been interesting to use the two-step RBSA on U.S. 
data to answer our problem statements.   
2.4.2. Survivorship Bias 
Survivorship bias occurs when the returns on defunct mutual funds are removed from the 
sample. Although this is likely to have affected all problem statements, the effect is most 
evident in problem statement 2 and 3.  
 
In problem statement 2, we use mutual funds that exist as of December 2010, and have close 
to at least 10 years with return-series. Since defunct funds typically have had poor returns, it 
is natural that their removals produce an unrealistically high estimate on the existing 
aggregate mutual fund performance. This is well documented with U.S. data. See e.g. Brown, 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1992) and Malkiel (1995). Using Norwegian data, Sørensen (2009) 
shows that the difference between the abnormal return of mutual funds that survive and those 
that die is highly significant. Hence, survivorship bias is likely to overstate the performance of 
our mutual funds.  
 
In problem statement 3, we investigate what happens to managerial performance after a 
change in mutual fund management. In some cases, the best alternative is not to change 
manager, but to close the fund. This is unfortunately not reflected in our analysis, and should 
be considered in future research. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have studied three important questions related to Norwegian mutual fund 
managers: 1) How much of the total variation in mutual fund return is explained by asset 
allocation, security selection and market timing respectively? 2) Is the average managerial 
performance positive? 3) Ceteris paribus, does a change in a mutual fund’s management cause 
a change in managerial performance? Let us summarize our findings separately:  
2.5.1. Problem statement 1:  
The total amount of variation in mutual fund return that is explained by security selection is 
on average 4.9%, whereas market timing explains 4.5% on average. On average, asset 
allocation explains 90.6% of the fund’s variation in return over time. These results imply that 
the investor has the largest responsibility for the fund’s variability and return over time, since 
they choose to bet on the risk that follows with the fund’s asset allocation. The average 
Norwegian mutual fund investor should therefore use more time on reviewing their fund’s 
asset allocation and less time on manager searches.  
2.5.2. Problem statement 2:  
We find that the average excess return is insignificant, even when we include the cost of 
benchmarking. However, we note that the mutual funds have historically been good in picking 
stocks. This implies that the Norwegian equity market cannot be efficient in the semi-strong 
form. Furthermore, we find that the mutual funds could have increased excess return 
substantially by ceasing to time the market. This suggests that there are reasons to believe that 
market timing should in general not be undertaken.  It is important to stress that the results are 
prone to survivorship bias. 
2.5.3. Problem statement 3:  
We find that replacement of poorly performing managers tends to be a value-enhancing 
activity for both the investment advisors and shareholders of the mutual fund. This implies 
that market for corporate control in the Norwegian mutual fund industry is effective in 
disciplining poorly performing fund managers.  
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By splitting excess return into security selection and market timing, we find that 
underperforming managers loose because they try to time the market. Moreover, the 
underperformers seem like they do not possess skills in security selection. Assuming that 
underperformers are replaced by average performers, we find that average managers avoid 
market timing, and do not have stock-picking skills. 
  
By analyzing the overperformers, we see that they avoid timing the market. Moreover, they 
differentiate themselves from the underperformers by being good in stock picking.  When we 
analyze the replacement of the very best managers, we see that excess return declines 
significantly. This indicates the scarcity of the very best managers, and underlines the 
importance of trying to keep such managers in the fund.  
2.5.4. Implication of Results – and Lessons to be drawn 
The empirical evidence generally point in the direction that an investor should spend more 
time on asset allocation, and less on security selection and market timing. By analyzing 
mutual fund managers, the results indicate that they should spend more time on security 
selection, since the Norwegian equity market is inefficient in the semi-strong form. Moreover, 
the managers should use less time on market timing; by ceasing to time the market, the 
average manager can substantially increase excess return. In fact, if poor managers cease to 
utilize market timing, they are likely to avoid getting fired. The best managers already 
understand this, and enjoy a good reputation and high excess returns.  
 
Let us end the thesis where it started. In Odyssey, we saw that deviations from the predefined 
route could cause death and injury. Similarly, the temptation of deviating from the predefined 
policy weights can cause dismantled mutual funds and fired managers. The lesson to be drawn 
is therefore as follows: to survive in the financial industry, bind yourself to the mast by 
sticking to your predefined policy weights! 
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APPENDIX 
3.1. APPENDIX A: Definitions 
Active Mutual Fund: a mutual fund that attempts to generate return in excess of a given 
benchmark 
Active Return: the mutual fund’s actual return in a given asset class 
Actual Style-Weights: the mutual fund’s exposures to particular asset classes of investments 
that reflect the fund’s movements in the short term 
Actual Weight: the mutual fund’s proportions placed in particular classes of investments in the 
beginning of the current period  
Asset Allocation: the long-term decision regarding the proportions of total assets that an 
investor chooses to place in particular classes of investments 
Asset Classes: certain categories of investment products 
Asset Class Portfolio Series:        
 
   
 
Benchmark (BHB‟s definition): a passive portfolio with equivalent risk as the mutual fund’s 
asset allocation 
Current Allocation: the shot-term decision regarding the proportions of total assets that an 
investor chooses to place in particular that an investor chooses to place in particular classes of 
investments at the beginning of the current period 
Excess Return: the sum of market timing and security selection 
Investment Philosophy: a coherent way of thinking about financial markets and how they 
work 
Market Timing: the strategic under- or overweighting of an asset class relative to its policy 
weight 
Passive Mutual Fund: a mutual fund that tries to track a given benchmark 
Passive Return: the benchmark return for a given asset class 
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Policy Style-Weight: the mutual fund’s exposures to particular asset classes of investments 
that reflect the fund’s movements in the long run 
Policy Weight: the mutual fund’s long-term proportion placed in particular classes of 
investments  
Rolling Style Decomposition: the dynamic method of estimating the actual and policy weights 
for each month in the period under study 
Security Selection: the active selection of investments within an asset class. 
Style: categorization of assets into broad classes 
Style Investing: process of using styles when making portfolio decisions 
Style-Weights: weight in a given asset class that reflect the movements of the mutual fund in 
period t = T-v to T-1 
v = time length for return-data in RBSA 
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3.2. APPENDIX B: Testing for Unit-Root  
In this appendix we will test the return-series for unit-root using an (Augmented) Dickey 
Fuller Test. We will first give a short description of the tests, before we show the results: 
 
Dickey-Fuller: 
Assume the data generating process for asset class i is as follows:  
                      
where:  
      = Asset class i‟s passive return in period t 
   = Constant 
    = Noise process 
This seems like a good way of describing our data, since financial return-series do not trend, 
and are likely to be positive on average. By subtracting       on the left and right hand side, 
we get the following expression: 
                                  
          +            , where       
We can then test for stationarity using the following hypothesis:  
H0:                     
H1:                             
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller: 
We can also control for the possibility that     can be correlated with lags of       through the 
use of an Augmented Dickey Fuller test: 
                             
 
   
     
Our hypothesis is as follows: 
H0:                     
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H1:                             
 
Results:  
When testing for unit-root in the 10 asset classes, we get the following results: 
 (Augmented) Dickey Fuller Test for return-series.  
Period: Jan. 1995 – Dec. 2010 
 
 
Conclusion: we cannot reject H0 for bonds and bills. We tested the bills and bonds with other 
lag-lengths as well, but the conclusion did not change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Augmented) Dickey Fuller Test for return-series
Period: Jan. 1995-Dec. 2010
Variable t-value Lags Trend? Constant?
S -0.76 -10.529 ** 0 No Yes
MG -0.89 -12.16 ** 0 No Yes
MV -0.92 -12.491 ** 0 No Yes
LG -0.99 -13.346 ** 0 No Yes
LV -1.02 -13.783 ** 0 No Yes
W -0.88 -12.025 ** 0 No Yes
E -0.83 -11.476 ** 0 No Yes
3M -0.02 -1.2996 1 No Yes
3Y -0.02 -1.5748 1 No Yes
10Y -0.03 -2.1021 1 No Yes
*   Significant at 5 % level. Critical value = -2.877
** Significant at 1 % level. Critical value = -3.467
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3.3. APPENDIX C: Confidence Interval of Style-Weights 
This proof is based on Lobosco and DiBartolomeo (1997). Consider the case where we 
actually have the true style-weights,    . The tracking error is then as follows:  
                
 
   ;    t = T-v, T-v+1,… ,T-1 
Consider the extent to which the estimates for the style-weighs do not march the true style-
weights:  
         +     
where:  
      = Mutual fund m’s estimated style-weight for asset class i 
     =  Mutual fund m’s (true) style-weight for asset class i 
      =  Amount of error in the estimate of mutual fund m’s style-weight for  
asset class i 
 
Style analysis can only reliable attribute portfolio returns to the portions of asset class returns 
that are themselves not attributable to the returns of the other asset classes. In order to get an 
estimate of the amount of error in the style-weights, the fitting process must therefore 
somehow isolate the portion of the asset classes’ returns that are independent of the other 
asset classes used in the analysis. To isolate this independent portion of each index, one can 
define: 
                        ;   t = T-v, T-v+1,… ,T-1 
and  
                
where:  
    = Asset class i’s return-series analyzed against all asset classes exclusive  
  of i 
    = Style-weight on asset class j 
       = Passive returns of asset class j 
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Note that we do not have any constraints on these weights saying that they should be in the 
range 0 to 1. We now define: 
               ;     t = T-v, T-v+1,… ,T-1 
where: 
      = Portion of the returns on asset class i not attributable to the other asset 
classes, subject to the constraint                .  
 
We have now got expressions for both the error in the style-weights (    ) and the 
independent portions of the asset class behaviors (    ). Only through the interaction of these 
two sets of values can the goodness of fit be varied. It can be shown that the operative process 
in style analysis is to try to minimize the variance of              
 
   
             for 
each t, or equivalently, minimize the variance of                  for each t. One can set an 
objective function, Z, to this expression:  
Z =                     =   
      
   
               
where: 
    =  Sample standard deviation 
    =  Sample correlation coefficient 
 e  =  Simplification of       
   =  Simplification of      
 
To solve for the minimum of the variance, we set the derivative of the variance with respect to 
the style-weights equal to zero:  
 
  
     
        
           
 
  
     
   if and only if      
     
  
 
Because the standard deviation for   is approximately 
 
    
, the standard deviation of      is 
approximated by  
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where: 
v = Time length of return-series 
Because we do not know the true style-weights, we do not know   . However, we know the 
standard error of the estimated tracking error: 
                         
 
   ;  t = T-v, T-v+1,… ,T-1 
We abbreviate      with   . Because    has (v-k) degree of freedom and   (     has (v-1) 
degrees of freedom, one can use the relation: 
    
  
  
      
     
 
where: 
k  = Number of asset classes with nonzero style-weights 
This can be rearranged and put back into the equation for       to get  
      
   
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
3.4. APPENDIX D: Current Mutual Funds 
 
 
 
 
List of Current active Norwegian mutual funds, with focus on Norwegian equity  
and have long-positions only: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mutual Funds Start date Mutual Funds Start date
Alfred Berg Aktiv 29.12.1995 Fondsfinans Aktiv 04.04.2000
Alfred Berg Aktiv II 15.09.1997 Handelsbanken Norge Acc 06.03.1995
Alfred Berg Gambak 01.11.1990 Holberg Norge 28.12.2000
Alfred Berg Humanfond 15.12.1999 KLP AksjeNorge 12.03.1999
Alfred Berg Norge + Acc 04.12.1997 NB Aksjefond 01.08.1996
Alfred Berg Norge Acc 01.10.1990 Nordea Avkastning 01.02.1981
Atlas Norge 24.02.1998 Nordea Kapital 01.01.1995
Avanse Norge (I) 01.10.1966 Nordea Norge Verdi 02.02.1996
Avanse Norge (II) 07.12.1990 Nordea SMB 21.05.1997
Carnegie Aksje Norge Acc 07.07.1995 Nordea Vekst 01.02.1981
Danske Invest Norge I 03.01.1994 ODIN Norge Acc 26.06.1992
Danske Invest Norge II 03.01.1994 Orkla Finans Investment 03.01.1985
Danske Invest Norge Vekst 03.01.1994 PLUSS Aksje (Fondsforvaltning) 27.12.1996
Danske Invest Norske Aksjer Inst I Acc 13.04.2000 PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforvaltning) 31.05.1994
Delphi Norge 03.06.1994 Postbanken Norge 27.07.1995
Delphi Vekst 20.10.1997 Storebrand Aksje Innland 01.07.1996
DnB NOR Barnefond 17.02.1997 Storebrand Norge 14.09.1983
DnB NOR Norge (I) 24.10.1981 Storebrand Norge I 03.04.2000
DnB NOR Norge (III) 06.02.1996 Storebrand Optima Norge A 28.12.2000
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) 19.04.1996 Storebrand Vekst 09.10.1992
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (II) 19.12.2001 Storebrand Verdi 22.12.1997
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) 13.06.1994 Terra Norge 03.04.1998
DnB NOR SMB 16.03.2001 Terra SMB 01.04.1998
Total number of mutal funds: 46
Source: Morningstar
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3.5. APPENDIX E:  
 
(Augmented) Dickey Fuller Test for return-series
Period: Jan. 2001-Dec. 2010***
Mutual Fund t-value Lags Trend? Constant?
Alfred Berg Aktiv -0,64 -5,05 ** 1 No Yes
Alfred Berg Aktiv II -0,80 -6,05 ** 1 No Yes
Alfred Berg Gambak -0,68 -5,18 ** 1 No Yes
Alfred Berg Humanfond -0,94 -6,80 ** 1 No Yes
Alfred Berg Norge + Acc -0,94 -6,79 ** 1 No Yes
Alfred Berg Norge Acc -0,83 -6,10 ** 1 No Yes
Atlas Norge -0,88 -6,64 ** 1 No Yes
Avanse Norge (I) -0,96 -6,52 ** 1 No Yes
Avanse Norge (II) -0,87 -6,30 ** 1 No Yes
Carnegie Aksje Norge Acc -0,88 -6,50 ** 1 No Yes
Danske Invest Norge I -1,04 -7,34 ** 1 No Yes
Danske Invest Norge II -1,04 -7,37 ** 1 No Yes
Danske Invest Norge Vekst -0,62 -5,05 ** 1 No Yes
Danske Invest Norske Aksjer Inst I Acc -0,86 -6,09 ** 1 No Yes
Delphi Norge -0,88 -6,36 ** 1 No Yes
Delphi Vekst -0,89 -6,61 ** 1 No Yes
DnB NOR Barnefond -0,91 -6,55 ** 1 No Yes
DnB NOR Norge (I) -1,05 -11,55 ** 1 No Yes
DnB NOR Norge (III) -0,87 -6,33 ** 1 No Yes
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) -0,89 -6,57 ** 1 No Yes
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (II) -0,71 -5,40 ** 1 No Yes
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) -0,82 -6,07 ** 1 No Yes
DnB NOR SMB -0,63 -5,12 ** 1 No Yes
Fondsfinans Aktiv -0,86 -6,04 ** 1 No Yes
Handelsbanken Norge Acc -0,82 -6,19 ** 1 No Yes
Holberg Norge -0,69 -5,48 ** 1 No Yes
KLP AksjeNorge -0,91 -6,59 ** 1 No Yes
NB Aksjefond -0,95 -6,97 ** 1 No Yes
Nordea Avkastning -1,05 -6,84 ** 1 No Yes
Nordea Kapital -0,85 -6,28 ** 1 No Yes
Nordea Norge Verdi -0,76 -5,72 ** 1 No Yes
Nordea SMB -0,73 -5,73 ** 1 No Yes
Nordea Vekst -0,89 -8,43 ** 1 No Yes
ODIN Norge Acc -0,68 -5,56 ** 1 No Yes
Orkla Finans Investment -0,82 -6,01 ** 1 No Yes
PLUSS Aksje (Fondsforvaltning) -1,00 -7,03 ** 1 No Yes
PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforvaltning) -1,06 -7,49 ** 1 No Yes
Postbanken Norge -0,90 -6,72 ** 1 No Yes
Storebrand Aksje Innland -0,89 -6,44 ** 1 No Yes
Storebrand Norge -0,96 -6,82 ** 1 No Yes
Storebrand Norge I -0,90 -6,25 ** 1 No Yes
Storebrand Optima Norge A -0,73 -5,51 ** 1 No Yes
Storebrand Vekst -0,74 -5,60 ** 1 No Yes
Storebrand Verdi -0,97 -6,89 ** 1 No Yes
Terra Norge -0,90 -6,63 ** 1 No Yes
Terra SMB -0,98 -7,07 ** 1 No Yes
**   Significant at 1 % level. Critical value = -3.501
*     Significant at 5 % level. Critical value = -2.892
*** Some of these series have close to 10 years with return data, but do not start in Jan. 2001
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3.6. APPENDIX F: Mutual funds in Problem Statement 2 
 
 
 
 
List of Mutual Funds used in problem statement 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mutual Fund with start date before 1996 Start date
Alfred Berg Aktiv 12/29/1995
Alfred Berg Gambak 11/1/1990
Alfred Berg Norge Acc 10/1/1990
Avanse Norge (I) 10/1/1966
Avanse Norge (II) 12/7/1990
Carnegie Aksje Norge Acc 7/7/1995
Danske Invest Norge I 1/3/1994
Danske Invest Norge II 1/3/1994
Danske Invest Norge Vekst 1/3/1994
Delphi Norge 6/3/1994
DnB NOR Norge (I) 10/24/1981
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) 6/13/1994
Handelsbanken Norge Acc 3/6/1995
Nordea Avkastning 2/1/1981
Nordea Kapital 1/1/1995
Nordea Vekst 2/1/1981
ODIN Norge Acc 6/26/1992
Orkla Finans Investment 1/3/1985
PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforvaltning) 5/31/1994
Postbanken Norge 7/27/1995
Storebrand Norge 9/14/1983
Storebrand Vekst 10/9/1992
Total number of mutal funds: 22
Source: Morningstar
95 
 
3.7. APPENDIX G: Mutual funds in Problem Statement 3 
Mutual Funds used in problem statement 3: 
 
3.8. APPENDIX H: Average return 
Geometric average monthly Excess Return, Security Selection and Market Timing, 2006 – 2010 
 
Mutual Fund Start Date Last Change
in Manager
Over or Under-
performer before 
change? (O/U?)
Avanse Norge (I) 10/1/1966 8/1/2007 U
Avanse Norge (II) 12/7/1990 8/1/2007 O
Danske Invest Norge I 1/3/1994 11/29/2006 U
Danske Invest Norge II 1/3/1994 11/29/2006 U
Danske Invest Norge Vekst 1/3/1994 4/1/2006 U
Delphi Norge 6/3/1994 12/1/2007 O
DnB NOR Norge (I) 10/24/1981 4/13/2005 O
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) 4/19/1996 8/1/2007 U
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) 6/13/1994 8/1/2007 O
NB Aksjefond 8/1/1996 9/1/2007 U
Nordea Avkastning 2/1/1981 4/29/2004 O
Orkla Finans Investment 1/3/1985 1/1/2007 U
Postbanken Norge 7/27/1995 7/4/2006 O
Storebrand Norge 9/14/1983 1/1/2007 O
Total number of mutal funds: 14
Source: Morningstar
Mutual Fund
Excess 
Return
Security
Selection
Market
Timing
Excess 
Return
Security
Selection
Market
Timing
Alfred Berg Aktiv 0,024 % 0,255 % -0,231 % 0,004 % 0,235 % -0,231 %
Alfred Berg Gambak 0,243 % 0,354 % -0,112 % 0,223 % 0,334 % -0,112 %
Alfred Berg Norge Acc 0,012 % 0,262 % -0,250 % -0,008 % 0,242 % -0,250 %
Avanse Norge (I) -0,096 % 0,171 % -0,266 % -0,116 % 0,151 % -0,266 %
Avanse Norge II -0,032 % 0,204 % -0,237 % -0,052 % 0,184 % -0,237 %
Carnegie Aksje Norge Acc 0,107 % 0,333 % -0,227 % 0,087 % 0,313 % -0,227 %
Danske Invest Norge I 0,070 % 0,409 % -0,340 % 0,050 % 0,389 % -0,340 %
Danske Invest Norge II 0,144 % 0,493 % -0,349 % 0,124 % 0,473 % -0,349 %
Danske Invest Norge Vekst -0,167 % -0,286 % 0,119 % -0,187 % -0,306 % 0,119 %
Delphi Norge 0,219 % -0,035 % 0,254 % 0,199 % -0,055 % 0,254 %
DnB Nor Norge (I) 0,058 % 0,399 % -0,341 % 0,038 % 0,379 % -0,341 %
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) 0,185 % 0,407 % -0,223 % 0,165 % 0,387 % -0,223 %
Handelsbanken Norge Acc 0,040 % 0,274 % -0,234 % 0,020 % 0,254 % -0,234 %
Nordea Avkastning -0,010 % 0,229 % -0,239 % -0,030 % 0,209 % -0,239 %
Nordea Kapital 0,009 % 0,256 % -0,247 % -0,011 % 0,236 % -0,247 %
Nordea Vekst -0,220 % 0,150 % -0,370 % -0,240 % 0,130 % -0,370 %
Odin Norge Acc -0,348 % -0,524 % 0,176 % -0,368 % -0,544 % 0,176 %
Orkla Finans Investment Fund -0,377 % -0,213 % -0,165 % -0,397 % -0,233 % -0,165 %
PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforvaltning) 0,071 % 0,346 % -0,275 % 0,051 % 0,326 % -0,275 %
Postbanken Norge 0,061 % 0,403 % -0,342 % 0,041 % 0,383 % -0,342 %
Storebrand Norge 0,043 % 0,227 % -0,184 % 0,023 % 0,207 % -0,184 %
Storebrand Vekst 0,297 % 0,182 % 0,116 % 0,277 % 0,162 % 0,116 %
Cost ExcludedCost Included
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